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THE LAW AND POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF CONTEMPORARY FOOD:
SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE LOCAL
AND THE SMALL
AMY J. COHEN*
I
INTRODUCTION
This article explores how ideas of size and scale function as categories of
legal analysis when food provisioning is at stake. Debates about how food is
produced and distributed are fundamentally debates about the structure of
economic exchange and thus are also often debates about the legal rules that
govern markets. At different moments in American legal thought, reformers
have deployed arguments about the size of market enterprise and the scale of
economic exchange in order to advocate for decentralized, democratic, and
small-scale socioeconomic relations. And they have actively recruited law to
advance their particular political-economic visions. This article asks how similar
ideas of size and scale motivate actors today who wish to create alternative
forms of capitalist food production and exchange—and why these ideas have
had comparatively less engagement with law.
Like other contributors to this symposium on contemporary legal thought, I
follow Duncan Kennedy’s map in order to make sense of our contemporary
legal moment—as well as to trace changes in the legal categories governing food
markets over time. Kennedy distinguishes among three modes of legal thought
that spread throughout the West and elsewhere between 1850 and 2000:
1
classical legal thought, social legal thought, and contemporary legal thought.
Because I am interested in the intersection of law and food, I add a parallel map
to Kennedy’s schema—namely, Harriet Friedmann and Philip McMichael’s
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in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19 (David M. Trubek &
Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
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studies of “food regimes.” Friedmann and McMichael describe three global
shifts in the structure of agricultural production and trade that roughly parallel
Kennedy’s historical periodization. By linking legal categories to categories of
food production and distribution, I illustrate how the temporal changes that
Friedmann and McMichael identify in food markets are made intelligible (even
possible) by changes in modes of legal thought.
But analyzing how law influences food is a one-sided frame. Also motivating
this article is the more dynamic idea that law and food are both good to think
with as contemporary objects and instruments of social and economic change.
Here, briefly, is what I mean. As Kennedy describes it, each mode of legal
3
thought is not a political ideology but rather a “consciousness” or “language.”
That is, modes of legal thought are temporally bounded epistemic perspectives
that—in different ways in different historical periods—provide the vocabulary
through which numerous kinds of regulations, judicial cases, social and
4
economic programs, and justificatory arguments are articulated. Imprinted in
Kennedy’s legal categories, then, are enduring cultural logics about the market,
the state, and economic development. Claude Lévi-Strauss famously argued
that food works in similar ways. “[T]he cooking of a society,” he wrote, “is a
language in which it unconsciously translates its structure—or else resigns itself,
5
still unconsciously, to revealing its contradictions.” That is, the production,
provisioning, and cooking of food likewise encode basic human attitudes about
the market, the state, law, technology, and sociocultural relations. As such,
changes in the language of food—like changes in the language of law—reflect
6
and require changes in these and other overlapping systems. Thus I begin this
article by describing how different modes of legal thought shape food systems
and enable their transformations. But I end by asking what contemporary food
movements reveal about the possibilities and limits of contemporary law.
Contemporary food movements have revived arguments about scale and
size, and more specifically about the local and the small, as representations for
ideas about desirable forms of market exchange—ideas that were once more
familiar in law. In the early part of the period that Kennedy calls social legal
thought, size and scale were salient legal categories of production and
distribution linked to questions of political economy. In the face of mass
industrialization, progressive legal reformers used these categories to demand
decentralization and the diffusion of power in the market as much as in the

2. See Harriet Friedmann & Philip McMichael, Agriculture and the State System: The Rise and
Decline of National Agricultures, 1870 to the Present, 29 SOCIOLOGICA RURALIS 93 (1989). Friedmann
and McMichael developed their food-regime analysis through a series of articles that, in turn, generated
a great deal of secondary literature. For one example see the special issue, Symposium on Food Regime
Analysis, 26 AGRIC. & HUM. VALUES 261 (2009).
3. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 23.
4. See id.
5. Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Culinary Triangle, in FOOD AND CULTURE: A READER 28, 35
(Carole Counihan & Penny Van Esterik eds., 1997).
6. My thanks to Harry West for this observation.
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state. These demands for economic democracy have had a renaissance in
food—but not in law. Today, progressive legal scholars are revitalizing efforts to
democratize state institutions by expanding stakeholder participation in
lawmaking and public life. But unlike their predecessors, contemporary legal
scholars rarely suggest that decentralized publics should be empowered to
regulate local economic conditions or that political citizenship requires a
measure of market deconcentration to enable the democratic self-governance of
economic life.
To illustrate this point, the second part of this article examines democratic
experimentalism—an influential decentralist legal reform movement that owes
a great deal to the work of Charles Sabel. In the 1980s, Sabel argued extensively
for decentralized, flexible, and relatively egalitarian forms of economic
production—arguments that rural sociologists today draw upon as a model for
7
agricultural reform. By contrast, for legal scholars, democratic experimentalism
now stands for a different aim: namely, to import existing forms of flexible
specialization from the market to restructure the institutions of the state. As we
shall see, the political-economic aspirations limned by Sabel in his early work
mostly vanished as democratic experimentalism became a project of
contemporary legal reform.
The third and final part of this article offers two examples of actors that are
revitalizing arguments about smallholder production, local democracy, and
market exchange: artisanal raw-milk cheese producers and fair trade activists.
These movements share features in common with Sabel’s early work and with
social-era ideas of political-economic deconcentration. For the most part,
however, they have an uneasy and ambivalent relationship to contemporary
law. I argue that for both analysts of law and food this gap is productive to think
with.
II
FOOD REGIMES AND LEGAL THOUGHT
This part retells Kennedy’s story of the globalization of law alongside
Friedmann’s and McMichael’s story of the globalization of food. Although all of
these scholars write from a transnational perspective, I focus my redescription
on the United States because I am interested in what studying food movements
illuminates about American law. In the amalgam that emerges, I pay particular
attention to how different actors use law to challenge economic concentration
and inequality in food systems, and how they use scale and size as progressive
analytics to express ideas for market reform.

7. See generally MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHARLES F. SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE:
POSSIBILITIES FOR PROSPERITY (1984).
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A. The First Food Regime, Classical Legal Thought, and the Rise of the
Family-Scale Commercial Farm
Classical legal thought, which Kennedy dates between 1850 and 1914,
governed the first food regime, which Friedmann and McMichael date between
8
1870 and 1914. Its defining feature was a period of economic liberalization that
9
Friedmann and McMichael call the first “international system” of food trade.
Classical jurists configured the market as a space of freedom, formal equality,
and individual will that was governed by the private law of property and
10
contract. They linked domestic free markets to the markets of other nationstates via private international law, which, Kennedy argues, was conceived as
11
“conceptually identical” to private domestic law. Classical legal thought thus
facilitated the creation of world markets in food (which operated alongside
12
older forms of colonial exchange). These new markets promoted competitive
trade between European and independent settler states for commodities such as
wheat and meat that were based, for the first time, on world prices linked to the
13
sterling gold standard.
Intriguingly, the competitive advantage of settler states for commodities
already produced in Europe depended on the rise of small-scale household
14
agricultural production. In the United States in the late nineteenth century, the
mechanization of harvesting machinery made family labor sufficient for a farm
15
to specialize in wheat as a cash crop. Mechanization, combined with the wide
16
availability of land and credit, placed household and “capitalist farms” (where
17
landowners hired wage labor) in direct competition. Household farms—
motivated more by survival than profit—undercut their capitalist competitors
18
by lowering their own standards of living and consumption. And when world
prices dropped after 1885, many large American wheat farms split into
19
household units. European countries, in turn, purposefully undermined
domestic food security by importing cheap wheat and other food produced by
family farms in settler states in order to subsidize the growth of their own
20
industrial working class. Unpaid household labor in the United States and
8. Friedmann & McMichael, supra note 2, at 95; Kennedy, supra note 1, at 21.
9. Friedmann & McMichael, supra note 2, at 95–96 (emphasis original).
10. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 25–26.
11. Id. at 34–35.
12. See Friedmann & McMichael, supra note 2, at 96, 100.
13. See id. at 99–100, 102; Harriet Friedmann, The Political Economy of Food: The Rise and Fall of
the Postwar International Food Order, 88 AM. J. SOC. S248, S256–57 (Supp.1982).
14. Friedmann & McMichael, supra note 2, at 95, 100–01.
15. Harriet Friedmann, World Market, State, and Family Farm: Social Bases of Household
Production in the Era of Wage Labor, 20 COMP. STUD. SOC’Y & HIST. 545, 551 (1978).
16. In 1862, Congress passed the Homestead Act making land grants available to individuals.
Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (repealed 1976).
17. Friedmann, supra note 15, at 551, 554, 564–71.
18. Id. at 568.
19. Id. at 574.
20. See Harriet Friedmann, From Colonialism to Green Capitalism: Social Movements and
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elsewhere thus “underwrote the developing [industrial] wage-relation and
21
attendant growth of food markets.”
Small-scale family wheat production thus consolidated in U.S. agriculture
around the same time that many other workers shifted from household to
22
industrial wage labor—a shift that was also facilitated by legal reform. During
the classical period, the law of the market separated from the law of the
household as legal ideas such as self-ownership and the sale of labor power
replaced an earlier legal regime based on “duties of obedience” and “rights to
23
support” in the home. What emerged as a result of this new legal and social
configuration was “classes of family farmers, which had never existed in
history”: what Friedmann calls “the fully commercial farm based on family
24
labor.” These family farmers could no longer survive based on subsistence
household production. Rather, they became full-fledged market actors who
increasingly specialized in single cash crops and employed early forms of
industrialization—buying industrial inputs and selling raw materials for simple
25
forms of industrial processing. And they depended upon export markets,
26
international free trade, and world prices for their survival.
Small-scale American farmers’ increasing participation in world markets
was accompanied by active, at times even explosive, participation in political
27
life. Farmers organized not only around their class interests—protesting, for
example, rising costs for industrial inputs and low world-market prices—but
28
more broadly around questions of political economy. They leveled criticisms at
American banking, monetary, taxation, and election policy, and in doing so
29
expressed their general distrust of centralized public and private power. Grant
McConnell thus describes this period, which peaked in the 1890s with Populist
Emergence of Food Regimes, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT
227, 234–36 (Frederick H. Buttle & Philip McMichael eds., 2005). Indeed, wheat imports to Europe
“almost sextupled between 1870 and 1929.” Friedmann, supra note 13, at S257.
21. Friedmann & McMichael, supra note 2, at 95. I should add: the United States was one of
several export settler states. Friedmann, supra note 20, at 237.
22. New industries, such as mills and factories, had removed significant forms of economic
production to a space outside the household. See, e.g., ALAN DAWLEY, CLASS AND COMMUNITY: THE
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN LYNN 77, 131, 224 (1976); MARY P. RYAN, CRADLE OF THE MIDDLE
CLASS 64–65 (1981); JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC 52–53 (2004).
23. Janet Halley, What is Family Law? A Genealogy, Part I, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 2–4
(2011); Kennedy, supra note 1, at 35.
24. Friedmann, supra note 20, at 235–36.
25. Friedmann & McMichael, supra note 2, at 100, 102.
26. Friedmann, supra note 20, at 235–36.
27. See GRANT MCCONNELL, THE DECLINE OF AGRARIAN DEMOCRACY 5 (1953). See also
LAWRENCE GOODWYN, THE POPULIST MOMENT: A SHORT HISTORY OF THE AGRARIAN REVOLT IN
AMERICA (1978); THOMAS H. GREER, AMERICAN SOCIAL REFORM MOVEMENTS: THEIR PATTERN
SINCE 1865 (1980) (chapter 3: “Farmers in Revolt”); JOHN D. HICKS, THE POPULIST REVOLT: A
HISTORY OF THE FARMERS’ ALLIANCE AND THE PEOPLE’S PARTY (1959).
28. MCCONNELL, supra note 27, at 5, 7.
29. Id. at 5. Still, as Greer explains, the “Agrarian Crusade” did not aim to “overthrow the existing
economic, social, or political system” but instead demanded reform in the interests of the “producing”
classes against “the banking–manufacturing” industrial sector. GREER, supra note 27, at 61.
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party politics, as one of “agrarian democracy,” a term he uses to capture the
30
political dimensions of farmers’ aspirations for market reform. For example,
the National Grange, which organized against monopolists and middlemen,
called for “a proper equality, equity and fairness” as “the very essence of
31
American independence.” These late-nineteenth-century agrarian demands—
32
articulated in the language of “equality and freedom” —represent what
33
Kennedy calls lay instantiations of classical legal thought. Will theory,
34
Kennedy observes, was “highly manipulable.” Agrarians, for example, could
claim that “bargains under capitalism did not represent ‘free will’” or that the
state had impermissibly interfered in the free market to privilege the interests of
35
industrial corporations and other large capitalists. Indeed, Lawrence Goodwyn
argues that farmers of this era catalyzed “the largest democratic mass
36
movement in American history.” The first food regime thus contained within it
a powerful populist democratic critique of food (and other) markets articulated
via the rhetorical tools of classical legal thought.
B. The Second Food Regime, the Social, and Market Consolidation
The social period, which Kennedy dates between 1900 and 1968, grew out of
legal reforms designed to mitigate the inequalities and conflicts of classical legal
37
thought as well as the rising social unrest articulated within it. Agrarian protest
subsided after the turn of the century in part due to higher market prices that
38
held steady until World War I. But when world prices for wheat fell by twothirds between 1925 and 1935, American family farmers were especially
39
vulnerable. They responded by growing more crops (perhaps because of their
40
household structure). And during the Great Depression, highly indebted,
impoverished farmers and “unsalable wheat stocks coexisted with hungry
41
people.” By the 1930s, farmers had organized into formidable coalitions to
42
demand legal protection from domestic and international markets. Congress
30. See MCCONNELL, supra note 27, at 3–9.
31. Id. at 6.
32. Id. at 8.
33. See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 27.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 27–28.
36. See GOODWYN, supra note 27, at VII.
37. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 21, 37–38.
38. MCCONNELL, supra note 27, at 11.
39. Friedmann, supra note 15, at 546.
40. Friedmann, supra note 20, at 237.
41. Id. at 238.
42. See, e.g., GREER, supra note 27, at ch. 7 (“Agriculture’s Modern Front)”; Richard S.
Kirkendall, The New Deal and Agriculture, in THE NEW DEAL: THE NATIONAL LEVEL 83, 85–96 (John
Braeman et al. eds., 1975) (describing farm strikes and protests in the early 1930s). Organized farm
lobbies had some success in the early 1920s securing legislative reform. For example, in 1921, the
Packers and Stockyards Act, ch. 64, 42 Stat. 159, prohibited packers from colluding in the purchase of
livestock. A year later, the Capper–Volstead Act of 1922, ch. 57, 42 Stat. 388, limited antitrust liability
for farmers who wished to collectively market their products. See GREER, supra note 27, at 224–25.
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responded with preferential measures ushering in what Friedmann and
McMichael call the second food regime—one based on state-managed
43
agriculture rather than free trade.
Crucially, in the social period, law itself was reconfigured. Classical jurists
understood law as a formal deductive technique; for them, the aim of legal
reasoning was to enable individuals (and states) to “realize their wills,
44
restrained only as necessary to permit others to do the same.” By contrast,
social judges, administrators, and legislators reasoned instrumentally “from the
45
social ‘is’ to the adaptive ought for law.” They eroded the classical distinction
between the public and private and refashioned law into an expansive and
purposive tool of intervention: “a regulatory mechanism that could and should
facilitate the evolution of social life in accordance with ever greater perceived
46
social interdependence at every level, from the family to the world of nations.”
The “social people,” as Kennedy calls them, also rejected the two exclusive
categories of classical legal analysis: rights-bearing individuals and the nation47
state. They instead embraced a corporatist idea of society comprised of plural
institutions “below and above the level of the state” as well as of organized
groups “between the level of the individual and people” with access to state
48
power. To that end, legal interventions were often designed to protect the
aggregate interests of various economic groups—such as farmers and workers.
Moreover, in social fashion, these interventions often did not grant new legal
49
rights but rather created new legal and administrative welfarist regimes.
What this meant for American agriculture was a series of New Deal–era
reforms designed in the class interests of (ultimately larger and certainly
landed) farmers. State planners identified overproduction as the core problem
50
driving down prices in agricultural markets. The Agricultural Adjustment Act
of 1933 aimed to raise farm incomes by compensating farmers who reduced the
51
number of acres they devoted to wheat and other basic crops. To maintain
target prices, the government purchased crops via the Commodity Credit
Corporation (CCC). The CCC, also created in 1933, issued loans at a

43. Friedmann & McMichael, supra note 2, at 103.
44. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 26.
45. Id. at 40.
46. Id. at 22.
47. See id. at 42.
48. Id. at 40–42.
49. See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 65–66 (explaining that “the general concept of a right” had “its
historical low point in the 1930s (heyday of right and left versions of the social)”).
50. Kirkendall, supra note 42, at 87.
51. The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-10, 48 Stat. 31. It was struck down
by the Supreme Court in 1936 on the grounds that Congress was not empowered to tax agricultural
processors and use the payments to raise farmer incomes. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
But the Act was mostly reissued with its core provisions for production controls intact (and upheld) as
the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31 (current version at 7 U.S.C. §
1281 (2012)). For details, see Harold F. Breimyer, Agricultural Philosophies and Policies in the New
Deal, 68 MINN. L. REV. 333, 342–44, 349–51 (1983).
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specifically calculated rate that functioned as a minimum price (and thus
effectively as a price subsidy); when market prices fell below this rate, the
52
government took title to the commodities. The government rather quickly
accumulated very large stocks of grain notwithstanding its efforts to encourage
53
voluntary production controls.
The second food regime, which consolidated after World War II, was
54
defined by the efforts of the United States to manage its oversupply of wheat.
Key to this regime was the newly established Bretton Woods international
monetary system, designed to foster international interdependence and trade
55
through stable exchange rates. Because this system tied world currencies to the
U.S. dollar, the United States created an export subsidy when it decided to sell
wheat abroad in negotiated prices in the currency of the importing nation
56
(which typically lacked foreign exchange). It cleverly named this policy “food
57
aid” and began exporting wheat first to postwar Europe, and then to
developing countries via the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance
58
Act of 1954, more commonly known as Public Law 480.
Between 1956 and 1965, American food aid comprised a stunning one-third
59
of world trade in wheat. Food aid enabled the United States to protect its own
domestic producers while cultivating Cold War allies among former colonies—
many of which were agrarian societies self-sufficient in food grains but would
60
soon come to rely on global markets for wheat. Third World governments
embraced subsidized imports of grain to undercut their own domestic
61
agricultural sectors in a drive towards industrialization. During the social
period, the role of national food provisioning was thus as McMichael argues:
“to subsidize, simultaneously, the First World social contract and Third World
62
urban-industrial development.” But because American domestic subsidies,
63
combined with massive subsidized exports, kept world prices low, small
American farmers did not benefit nearly as much as large ones, and during the
social period “the number of farmers had fallen to a tiny percentage of the

52. Friedmann, supra note 13, at S258; Friedmann, supra note 24, at 239; see also Breimyer, supra
note 51, at 346–47.
53. Friedmann, supra note 13, at S258.
54. For a detailed description, see id.
55. See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 57–58.
56. Friedmann, supra note 13, at S259, S262–63.
57. Friedmann, supra note 20, at 241; Friedman, supra note 13, at S260–61.
58. Friedmann, supra note 13, at S261–62. See Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance
Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-480, Tit. 1, 68 Stat. 454, 455–57 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1691
(2008)). By 1956, half of U.S. economic aid was food aid. Friedmann, supra note 13, at S262.
59. More precisely, 31.8 percent between 1956 and 1960 and 35.6 percent between 1961 and 1965.
Friedmann, supra note 13, at S264.
60. Id. at S259; Friedmann, supra note 20, at 241–42.
61. Friedmann, supra note 13, at S267–69; Friedmann & McMichael, supra note 2, at 104.
62. Philip McMichael, Global Development and the Corporate Food Regime, in NEW DIRECTIONS
IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT, supra note 20, at 272.
63. Friedmann, supra note 13, at S266.
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64

population because of the very success of the regime.”
The second food regime also witnessed intensive industrialization of
agriculture and meat production in the United States as food became an
65
increasingly manufactured product sold by corporate retail chains.
Industrialization helped to “renationalize” foods that the United States had
previously imported from former colonies. For example, large food-processing
corporations replaced sugar with chemical sweeteners and domestic corn
66
products, and they replaced temperate and tropical oils with domestic soy. The
postwar social period thus “framed the emergence of a number of giant
agrofood capitals, which eventually became powerful actors, whose interests
67
diverged from both farmers and national states.” Indeed, what began as a legal
regime that included a measure of domestic protection for smaller family-scale
farmers ended with the consolidation of large agribusiness corporations anxious
to escape the regulatory controls of social law.
C. Size and Scale as Representations of Decentralization and Democratic SelfGovernment in Social Law
In retrospect, America’s path towards large-scale industrialized agriculture
is unsurprising. As Kennedy writes, the social after World War II was
68
Keynesian. Keynesian policies of economic recovery required an economy of
mass consumption and production and, in turn, state regulations (such as the
Agricultural Adjustment Act) designed to stabilize mass markets. But, as others
69
have argued, this path did not always appear inevitable, and it was certainly
not uncontested. In the 1930s, agrarians and other “decentralist intellectuals”
attacked large-scale industrialization and big business as responsible for
dispossessing small farmers, shopkeepers, and manufacturers, producing a
70
propertyless class of workers and concentrating economic and political power.
Many of these decentralists represent what Kennedy describes as a particular
progressive strand of the social preoccupied with “land reform, in the broadest
sense, including the transformation of large into viable small properties, the
agglomeration of minifundia into cooperatives, the abolition of tenure forms
like sharecropping,” the creation of cooperative marketing boards and
71
cooperative forms of agricultural finance. To that end, they criticized New
64. Friedmann, supra note 20, at 246. Friedmann explains that “[p]artly through success of support
policies . . . the number of people working in agriculture fell by more than half between 1950 and 1972”
from fifteen to five percent of the total population. Friedmann, supra note 13, at S274. But it was not
just price supports that advantaged large farms: “industrialization of agriculture subordinated farmers
to large agricultural input and food-processing firms.” Friedmann, supra note 24, at 246.
65. Friedmann & McMichael, supra note 2, at 103; Friedmann, supra note 20, at 240.
66. Friedmann & McMichael, supra note 2, at 109; Friedmann, supra note 20, at 244.
67. Friedmann, supra note 20, at 240.
68. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 57.
69. See generally PIORE & SABEL, supra note 7, and infra Part II.
70. Edward S. Shapiro, Decentralist Intellectuals and the New Deal, 58 J. AM. HIST. 938, 939 (1972).
71. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 55. This decentralist defense of rural America and small business
also included conservative voices concerned with, for example, preserving rural-oriented religious
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Deal reforms such as the Agricultural Adjustment Act for intensifying
dependency on public support rather than fostering economic self-sufficiency
through, for example, widespread property ownership and tenancy reform for
72
(often minority) sharecroppers and the rural poor.
During the social period, it was not only lay or fringe thinkers but elite
reformers, such as Louis Brandeis and John Dewey, who expressed arguments
about the dangers of industrial consolidation and state planning. As legal
historian William Forbath puts it:
What the Populists and labor radicals did for agrarian and working class movements,
Progressive thinkers like Brandeis and John Dewey did for later middle-class and elite
reformers: They interpreted the emergence of big business and corporate capitalism in
terms of an inherited democratic constitutional tradition, and, in doing so, limned a
73
vision for the future.

Because Brandeis features on Kennedy’s map as an exemplary social jurist,
74
it is worth pausing to examine a few of his more famous ideas. Like other
decentralist reformers of his time, Brandeis argued that the problem with
market concentration was political—not simply economic. “Business,” he
explained, “may become as harmful to the community by excessive size, as by
75
monopoly or the commonly recognized restraints of trade.” Big business
requires a big state to regulate it—and both deprive citizens of opportunities for
democratic participation at a scale meaningful for human development and self76
rule. Adolf Berle, Jr. summarized the point as follows: “There is [Brandeis’s]
passionate belief in the doctrine that men are entitled to fulfill themselves;
hence democracy; hence the desire for preservation of local experimentation;
hence the fear of the overmastering big combination; hence also the fear of an
77
overmastering federal government.” Thus even as Brandeis supported federal
regulation of corporations, he cautioned that “[t]he federal government must

morality and household structures. See Shapiro, supra note 70, at 940–41. Agrarians also split between
those who favored racial equality and solidaristic class politics among poor rural blacks and whites and
those who championed white supremacy. See PAUL K. CONKIN, THE SOUTHERN AGRARIANS 73, 100,
117 (1988).
72. Shapiro, supra note 70, at 942–44, 948, 951. These decentralists supported early New Deal
measures like the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Rural Electrification Administration. Id. at 944.
Alternative proposals for agrarian reforms also included state ownership of services such as railways
and grain elevators and strengthening farmers’ cooperatives. By contrast, the AAA’s regime of
production controls “resolved the farm crisis without violating the constraints of the industrial capitalist
economy” or “challenging the position of dominant class interests within agriculture.” Kenneth
Finegold, From Agrarianism to Adjustment: The Political Origins of New Deal Agricultural Policy, 11
POL. & SOC’Y 1, 7–11, 25–27 (1982).
73. William E. Forbath, Why is this Rights Talk Different From All Other Rights Talk? Demoting
the Court and Reimagining the Constitution, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1771, 1800 (1994).
74. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 47.
75. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 574 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
76. STEPHEN W. BASKERVILLE, OF LAWS AND LIMITATIONS: AN INTELLECTUAL PORTRAIT OF
LOUIS DEMBITZ BRANDEIS 307–08, 325–26 (1994).
77. SAMUEL J. KONEFSKY, THE LEGACY OF HOLMES AND BRANDEIS: A STUDY IN THE
INFLUENCE OF IDEAS 171 (1956) (quoting Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The Way of an American, 25 SURV.
GRAPHIC 597 (1936)).
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not become too big just as corporations should not be permitted to become too
big. You must remember that it is the littleness of man that limits the size of
78
things we can undertake.”
For Brandeis, this attention to human scale meant that the question of
American democracy could not be confined to the realm of the political. “[S]ide
79
by side with political democracy,” he argued, “comes industrial democracy.”
And “democracy,” he explained further, “demands . . . ‘distributing power’:
consumer power, economic power, political power and the power of human
80
creative development” —for example, forms of industrial organization that
entitle workers to “not only a voice but a vote” and to meaningful participation
81
in the management of their firms. He doubted the possibility of this sort of
democratic self-governance unless states used their legislative power “to set a
limit upon the size of corporate units” and thus to set a limit upon the
82
“concentration of power.” To that end, Brandeis developed a social-era
jurisprudence of market regulation that explicitly differentiated between the big
and the small.
As an apt example of this jurisprudence, consider Brandeis’s efforts to curb
the power of large retail chains. In the early twentieth century, classical jurists
struck down efforts by states to limit department stores and later chain stores
by, for example, issuing graduated licenses fees or taxes based on how many
stores a single corporation owned and the extent of these stores’ geographical
83
reach. From a classical perspective, these sorts of legislative restrictions
impermissibly interfered with the rights of all market actors to buy and sell on
formally equal terms. According to Richard Schragger, the classical line of
reasoning held steady in the judiciary throughout the 1920s, defeating anti-chain
84
and anticorporate legislation (with Brandeis regularly dissenting). In 1931,
however, the Supreme Court, in State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson,
upheld a state tax on chain stores precisely by distinguishing between the
85
ownership and organization of chains versus independent stores. The Court
supplied a number of social facts about the purchasing and management

78. BASKERVILLE, supra note 76, at 311 (quoting Brandeis).
79. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF LOUIS D.
BRANDEIS 140–41 (Osmond K. Fraenkel ed., 1935).
80. BASKERVILLE, supra note 76, at 291 (quoting Brandeis).
81. See BRANDEIS, supra note 79, at 83.
82. Id. at 80.
83. For a fascinating and detailed account, see Richard C. Schragger, The Anti-Chain Store
Movement, Localist Ideology, and the Remnants of the Progressive Constitution, 1920–1940, 90 IOWA L.
REV. 1011, 1030–34 (2005).
84. Id., at 1035–38. See, e.g., Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389, 410–11 (1928)
(Brandies, J., dissenting) (“[T]here are still intelligent, informed, just-minded, and civilized persons
who believe that the . . . evils incident to the accelerating absorption of business by corporations
outweigh the benefits thereby secured; and that the process of absorption should be retarded.”).
85. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 537–38 (1931). The case “was initially
hailed by some opponents of the Lochner Court as a victory for Brandeis and Holmes.” Schragger,
supra note 83, at 1040.
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practices of chains to conclude that the state had drawn a qualitative
86
distinction—and one that was legitimate to advance social welfare.
This decision generated a good deal of debate. But the terrain of the debate
was shifting. Whereas dissenting justices rejected (in classical form) the legal
salience of a distinction between chains and independent stores, describing
87
them instead as formally equivalent market actors, liberal New Dealers
88
challenged the case on competing social welfarist and scalar grounds. Charles
Beard, for example, argued that the kind of large-scale, scientific, centralized
state planning of production and industry envisioned by liberal New Deal
reformers required large-scale, standardized systems of distribution: hence
chains. In Beard’s words, “Planned production without rationalized retailing is
89
an impossibility.” And two years later, when litigants challenged a similar but
more extensive antichain law before the Supreme Court, they attached Beard’s
90
argument to their brief.
This time the Court struck down the tax with Brandeis (as well as Stone and
91
Cardozo) dissenting. Significantly, in an impassioned (forty-page) dissent,
Brandeis not only justified the state’s distinctions. He advocated for
cooperatives as a viable economic alternative to retail chains (which, between
92
1933 and 1936, increased over twofold ). “Americans seeking escape from
corporate domination,” Brandeis wrote,
have open to them under the Constitution another form of social and economic
control. . .They may prefer the way of co-operation, which leads directly to the
freedom and the equality of opportunity which the Fourteenth Amendment aims to
secure. That way is clearly open. For the fundamental difference between the
capitalistic [corporate] enterprise and the co-operative—between economic
absolutism and industrial democracy—is one which has been commonly accepted by
Legislatures and the courts as justifying discrimination in both regulation and
93
taxation.

That is, Brandeis urged states to view not only difference in size but also
94
difference in social organization as reasonable grounds for discrimination. And
86. See Jackson, 283 U.S. at 534–35, 541–42.
87. See id. at 544–45 (Sutherland, J., dissenting); see also Schragger, supra note 83, at 1039–40.
88. Schragger, supra note 83, at 1042–44.
89. Charles A. Beard, Planning and Chain Stores, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 30. 1932, at 66.
90. See id. In Jackson, state legislation had distinguished between the ownership and management
structure of chain stores versus independent stores, taxing chains based on the number stores under
single ownership. Jackson, 283 U.S. at 530–33. In Liggett, state legislation also increased license fees
based on the number of different counties that chain stores occupied—a scalar classification the
majority found unreasonable. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 528–30, 533–34 (1933).
91. Liggett, 288 U.S. at 532–35.
92. LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMER’S REPUBLIC: THE POLITICS OF MASS CONSUMPTION IN
POSTWAR AMERICA 25 (2003). That said, cooperatives remained marginal in the United States; they
never accounted for more than 1.5 percent of national retail sales. Id.
93. Liggett, 288 U.S. at 579. (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). See also BASKERVILLE,
supra note 76, at 298–301.
94. Brandeis wrote at length about the dangers of excessive size in Liggett—which “alone,” he
argued, “gives to giant corporations a social significance not attached ordinarily to smaller units of
private enterprise.” Liggett, 288 U.S. at 565–66. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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he encouraged them to use their lawmaking power to favor economic activity
organized through decentralized and democratic forms of control.
At issue, then, in this case were competing ideals of the social good.
Brandeis articulated a decentralist vision of political economy that he attempted
to inscribe into law. But it lost—rather quickly—to a competing liberal ideology
about the optimal size and scale of the market and the state. This competing
ideology—based on the values of centralized, rationalized, and scientific
management suggested by Beard above—counseled planners to stabilize the
economy by working with, rather than against, big business and mass
95
production. Thus, for example, the National Industrial Recovery Act limited
antitrust liability precisely in order to enable firms to combine in ways that
96
would facilitate industry-wide state planning. Although the Act was declared
97
unconstitutional shortly after it was enacted, the working partnership it
suggested between corporations and the state became the liberal governing
consensus of the late New Deal (legitimated, for those on the left, by collective
98
bargaining). By the end of 1930s, the New Deal coalition, especially the
executive branch, “came to represent centralization, bureaucratization, and a
99
new kind of urban liberalism sharply distinct from the older Progressivism.”
And public administrative agencies adopted the centralized and hierarchical
organization of the mass corporation that they were tasked with facilitating and
100
regulating.
I should make clear: this 1930s liberal embrace of bigness as a strategy of
economic and political reform is related to, but not the same as, the political
ideology of bigness that is more familiar today. The intellectual roots of this
second defense of bigness, however, are also in the social period—most
101
prominently in Ronald H. Coase’s 1937 The Nature of the Firm. Largely
102
unread at the time, the article was an effort to explain why economic
transactions are often not coordinated through the price signals of the market
but rather through the hierarchical and bureaucratic organization of the firm.
Coase argued that his answer—that using markets involves costs—allowed him
103
“to treat scientifically the determinants of the size of the firm.” That is, he
95. Schragger, supra note 83, at 1072.
96. See National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933) (repealed 1935).
97. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
98. See Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and
Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1379, 1423–27 (1993). Brandeis, I should add, was broadly
supportive of unions. Still, he advocated for more cooperative relations made possible by applying
principles of “diversity . . . decentralization, financial and territorial, with protective federations”—
measures he thought would help keep conflicts small and manageable. BASKERVILLE, supra note 76, at
295–97.
99. EDWARD A. PURCELL, BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION 38 (2000).
100. See Michel C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 267, 292–93 (1998).
101. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
102. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Influence, 4 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 33, 33 (1988).
103. Coase, supra note 101, at 394.
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predicted that firms should “expand until the costs of organising an extra
transaction within the firm become equal to the costs of carrying out the same
transaction by means of an exchange on the open market or the costs of
104
organising in another firm.” For Coase, how such costs are calculated and
compared depends on complex temporal and social factors. “Changes like the
telephone and the telegraph,” he explained, “which tend to reduce the cost of
organising spatially will tend to increase the size of the firm. All changes which
105
improve managerial technique will tend to increase the size of the firm.” But
the basic point was that firms should expand up and until there are “diminishing
106
returns.”
This idea would provide an intellectual foundation of our
contemporary legal defense of “efficient monopolies” left unconstrained by a
107
diminishing and deregulatory state.
In the 1930s and 1940s, however, Brandeis did not lose to Reagan-style
neoliberalism and its policies of concentrated private wealth. Rather, he lost to
Keynesian politics of World War II recovery, which established a regulated
108
market economy, the near complete integration of industry and agriculture,
109
and a welfare state fueled by state interventions to support mass consumption.
Indeed, some Keynesians argued that mass consumption—enabled and
required by mass production—would itself promote democratic and egalitarian
110
values by distributing purchasing power as widely as possible.
In the following decades, this postwar vision of the social good came to
111
embody development. The United States exported its own trajectory of mass
production, distribution, and consumption in highly material form: in the case
of food, first through food aid and then through “Green Revolution”
technologies, a high-intensity approach to farming including seeds and
112
pesticides produced by American industries. But for much of the world, this
developmental trajectory would not be clear-cut. Indeed, in the early 1970s, the
second food regime ended in crisis around the same time that Kennedy dates as
113
the end of the social in law.
D. The Collapse of the Second Food Regime and the Rise of Contemporary
Legal Thought
Two world problems marked the collapse of the second food regime: that of

104. Id. at 395.
105. Id. at 397.
106. Id. at 395.
107. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 22 (1976).
108. McMichael, supra note 62, at 271.
109. See COHEN, supra note 92.
110. Id. at 55. Lizbeth Cohen describes the complex effects of a growing mass-consumption
economy that redistributed access and opportunity and yet benefitted the middle class more than the
working class, men more than women, and whites more than African Americans.
111. Id.
112. Friedmann, supra note 20, at 243.
113. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 62 (dating the end of the social period as approximately 1968).
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hunger and of free trade. As we shall see, both these problems and their
solutions were articulated in the language of contemporary legal thought.
Hunger first. In many developing economies, urbanization outpaced
industrialization. As a result, the number of people who needed to purchase
114
imported wheat outnumbered those who could afford to do so. In 1972 and
1973, world markets for wheat based on American subsidies unraveled when
the United States sold an enormous amount of grain to the Soviet Union as part
115
of détente, depleting its supplies. As a result, the price of wheat more than
116
tripled. Spikes in oil prices a year later increased cost of food even further,
compelling developing countries dependent on imports to borrow money from
117
private banks. “Suddenly,” Friedmann argues, “billions of people were
118
defined as ‘food insecure.’”
In response, in 1974, the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization called a
World Food Summit. But when representatives of 135 nation-states gathered in
Rome, they did not discuss the problems of markets, let alone the problems of
public and private concentration in them, but rather the idea that people lacked
119
food. The summit framed the solution to hunger in the language of rights—
namely, an “inalienable right to be free from hunger and malnutrition”—and it
120
created an International Undertaking on World Food Security. It is to this
moment, Friedmann observes, that we can trace our current dominant
121
discursive ideas of a right to food and food security.
At the same time, agribusiness corporations, which had vastly increased in
power and transnational scale during the second food regime, desired greater
trade liberalization. They “found themselves constrained by the mercantile
122
trading rules and domestic subsidies of the [second food] regime.” Moreover,
European countries had adopted protectionist policies and, with surpluses
themselves, began to compete intensely with the United States for export
123
markets.
As competition increased, export subsidies could no longer
114. Friedmann, supra note 13, at S272.
115. Id. at S249–50, S272.
116. Friedmann, supra note 20, at 244.
117. See id. at 244–45.
118. Id. at 245.
119. Id.
120. See Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition, ¶¶ 1, 12 U.N. Doc.
E/CONF. 65/20 (1974).
121. Friedmann, supra note 20, at 245. Of course, the right to food has earlier roots, appearing first
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. DOC. A/RES/217(III) at
art. 25 (1948) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and
Malnutrition], and then in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, GA
Res. 2200, U.N. DOC. A/RES/21/2200 at art. 11 (Dec. 16, 1966). But its discursive reach expanded
significantly with the 1974 Word Food Summit and then the 1996 Rome Declaration on World Food
Security, which declared food security a universal right. World Food Summit, Rome, It., Nov. 13-17,
1996, Rome Declaration on World Food Security and World Food Summit Plan of Action, 1, WFS 96/3
(Nov. 13–17, 1996).
122. Friedmann, supra note 20, at 244.
123. Id. at 243, 245–46.
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masquerade as aid. In 1986, the United States, the Cairns Group, the
European Community, and other wheat exporting countries began General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations to include agriculture
within formal legal trade agreements—negotiations that culminated in 1994
125
with the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Agriculture.
As agriculture was reconfigured as world trade, hunger was reframed as an
increasingly privatized and internationalized problem. Early interpretations of
the right to food within international organizations echoed ideas of the postwar
social left. There were, for example, proposals for income redistribution to
126
ensure that individual consumers could access food available via markets, as
well as proposals for states to ensure adequate supplies of commercial food at
127
“reasonable prices.”
By the 1980s and 1990s, however, food security
increasingly became a question of how individual households could increase
their purchasing power by participating in markets, and how international
markets could increase efficient supplies through free trade, technological
128
innovation (including biotechnology), and comparative advantage.
For
example, advocating on behalf of agribusiness interests, the United States in
WTO negotiations argued that food security was “best provided through a
129
smooth-functioning world market.” This vision of food security recruits states
and transnational legal institutions to establish and enforce legal rules enabling
“free” markets, including strong protection for intellectual property rights such
as patented seeds.
Both the human right to food and the corporate right to property are
intelligible—indeed predictable—in the language of contemporary legal
thought. According to Kennedy, contemporary legal thought revives classical
legal thought with its emphasis on rights and formal logic (legal categories that
Kennedy suggests were at a “historical low point” in the 1930s version of the
130
social ). This strand of contemporary legal thought, which Kennedy calls
neoformalism, envisions “law as the guarantor of human and property rights
and of intergovernmental order through the gradual extension of the rule of
131
law, understood as judicial supremacy.” Its key unit of legal analysis, Kennedy

124. Id. at 245.
125. Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410. Of course, despite the agreement, the United States and other
countries in the global north have continued to provide commodity specific subsidies that mostly
benefit large agribusiness. See Friedmann, supra note 20, at 246–47.
126. Friedmann, supra note 20, at 248, 261 n.15 (describing the position of the New International
Economic Order).
127. See Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition, supra note 120, at
(g); see also Madeleine Fairbairn, Framing Resistance: International Food Regimes & the Roots of Food
Sovereignty, in FOOD SOVEREIGNTY: RECONNECTING FOOD, NATURE & COMMUNITY 15, 22–23
(Hannah Wittman et al. eds., 2010); Friedmann, supra note 20, at 248.
128. Fairbairn, supra note, at 127, at 24–26; McMichael, supra note 62, at 276–81.
129. McMichael, supra note 62, at 277 (citation omitted).
130. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 65–66.
131. Id. at 22.
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argues, is identity—or rather members of marginalized identity groups—not the
organized groups or classes of the social period nor even the atomized
132
individuals and nation-states of classical legal thought. Thus, for example,
when the right to food is presented in collective terms, it is often couched as a
133
matter of cultural survival. And multinational corporations themselves have
adopted identity/rights discourse by transforming the ownership of property
(such as patents and trademarks) “into a minoritarian identity and government
regulation into the analog of discrimination by legislative majorities” (often by
134
the legislatures in developing countries).
In addition to rights discourse, however, there is a second, and seemingly
contradictory, trend in contemporary legal thought. Here, jurists and lawmakers
think about law and legal technique not as the production of absolutist legal
rules and rights but rather “as the pragmatic balancing of conflicting
135
considerations.” The analytic roots of this approach—which Kennedy calls
136
“conflicting considerations” or “policy analysis”—are in the social. But rather
than purposefully shaping legal rules to advance a single or obviously desirable
social end, this kind of policy analysis more modestly and pragmatically aims to
balance among competing visions of the good, manage difference and
uncertainty, and produce ad hoc compromises. In this mode, legal questions are
subject to expert cost-benefit assessments, scientific studies, and public and
private standard setting. Think, for example, of genetically modified foods.
Against a minority of voices that called for an absolute ban on genetically
modified organisms (GMOs) as an unjust form of agribusiness, we have a legal
regime governed by instrumental cost-benefit calculations measuring social risk
(typically, environmental and health risks, such as antibiotic resistance and
137
allergic reactions). Thus, on Kennedy’s map, two approaches to legal
analysis—reconfigured elements of classical thought in the form of rights
neoformalism and reconfigured elements of the social in the form of policy
138
analysis—now coexist together.

132. Id. at 65–66.
133. For example, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has developed jurisprudence that
protects the collective property rights of indigenous people as a means of material and cultural survival
including, fundamentally, producing and obtaining food. See, e.g., Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous
Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. of H. R. (ser. C) No.
146 ¶¶118, 120, 131, 132 (Mar. 29, 2006); Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R.(ser. C) No. 125 ¶¶131, 135, 140, 146, 147, 154
,155 (June 17, 2005); Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶¶ 140(f), 148, 149, 153 (Aug. 31, 2001).
134. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 67.
135. Id. at 22.
136. Id. at 22, 64.
137. See generally CHAIA HELLER, FOOD, FARMS & SOLIDARITY: FRENCH FARMERS
CHALLENGE INDUSTRIAL AGRICULTURE AND GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS (2013).
138. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 63.
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E. What Remains of the Social Today?
Let me conclude this part by summarizing how the social does and does not
persist on Kennedy’s map of contemporary legal thought. Kennedy identifies
the presence of the social today in two distinct forms. The first form, as I have
just suggested, is the transfiguration of the social into policy analysis, which is
politically indeterminate. The second form is an independent or “left-over
social” that when deployed “in the law of the market” is now discursively
“almost always a progressive stance,” and is characteristically expressed in the
139
language of human rights (such as the human right to food).
Mostly gone in elite legal discourse today is the social emphasis on size and
scale that in the hands of early social-era progressive legal reformers, such as
Brandies, fueled arguments for economic democracy. Consider, once more, the
case of GMOs. In the late 1990s, transnational activists campaigned intensely to
ban GMOs as a threat to smallholder agriculture. They argued that GMOs
undercut small farmer autonomy by making farmers dependent on large
agribusiness for seeds and pesticides and by forbidding them from saving and
sharing seeds, thus destroying community-scale relationships and local
140
knowledge networks. Against food security, small farmers’ movements
demanded food sovereignty—a term purposefully chosen to highlight the
political-economic dimensions of smallholder agricultural production and trade,
namely the idea that food provisioning should happen at a scale that allows for
a meaningful amount of self-determination, self-reliance, and democratic
141
control. In this sense, food sovereignty evokes populist and early social-era
agrarian arguments about economic self-governance as its own political good.
Food sovereignty, however, is also a creature of its times; it draws on the
rhetorical tools of contemporary legal thought. For example, the International
Peasant’s Movement, La Via Campesina, which introduced the term in the 1996
World Food Summit, describes food sovereignty as “the right of peoples . . . to
142
define their own food and agriculture systems.” That said, food sovereignty
did not penetrate contemporary elite legal rights discourse. When rights claims
enter GMO debates, the rights invoked tend to be consumers’ rights to
information and choice, not producers’ rights to participatory self143
determination. Nor did food sovereignty penetrate elite legal policy analysis
139. Id. at 64.
140. See generally HELLER, supra note 137.
141. See id. at 264–69, 271.
142. See What is La Via Campesina?, LA VIA CAMPESINA (Feb. 9, 2011, 2:08 PM),
http://viacampesina.org/en/index.php/organisation-mainmenu-44 (emphasis added). Food sovereignty
also includes the right of peoples “to protect and regulate domestic agricultural production and trade in
order to achieve sustainable development objectives; to determine the extent to which they want to be
self reliant; [and] to restrict the dumping of products in their markets.” Main Issues: Food Sovereignty
and Trade, LA VIA CAMPESINA (Sept. 2, 2003, 6:12 PM), http://viacampesina.org/en/index.php/mainissues-mainmenu-27/food-sovereignty-and-trade-mainmenu-38/396-peoples-food-sovereignty-wto-outof-agriculture. See also Michael Fakhri & Nathan Bellinger, The Intersection between Food Sovereignty
and Law, 26 A.B.A. NAT. RES. & ENV’T 2 (2013).
143. See generally Debra M. Strauss, The Role of Courts, Agencies, and Congress in GMOs: A
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of GMOs, which remains focused on assessing and balancing risk to
environmental and human health. Today, political fights about smallness and
bigness—and with them normative arguments about smallholder production as
a means to the ends of community, autonomy, and economic self-governance—
are not readily articulated by American legal elites. As I explore in the
following part, current efforts by legal scholars to revive a progressive program
of political decentralization are a telling case in point.
II
CONTEMPORARY PROGRESSIVE DECENTRALISTS, DEMOCRATIC
EXPERIMENTALISM, AND THE BIGNESS OF NEOLIBERALISM
In this part, I shift from an overarching legal-historical map of food
production and distribution to a close examination of one contemporary
decentralizing legal reform movement. I do so in order to illustrate how, among
progressive “decentralist” legal academics today, ideas of size and scale are less
relevant to reform markets than public sector institutions—an approach to
social change that, as the following part argues, diverges markedly from the
practices and aspirations of contemporary food activists.
A. Contemporary Progressive Decentralist Movements in Law
The last two decades of American legal thought have witnessed a
proliferation of progressive legal reform projects that take scale seriously.
These are projects dedicated to decentralizing political decisionmaking,
lawmaking, and dispute resolution so that “the people themselves” can actively
participate. Consider the growth of fields in law such as deliberative
144
145
democracy,
extrajudicial progressive constitutionalism,
consensus146
147
building, new governance or democratic experimentalism, as well as
148
prominent progressive defenses of federalism.
However, as Schragger aptly observes, progressive contemporary legal
Multilateral Approach to Ensuring the Safety of the Food Supply Chain, 48 IDAHO L. REV. 267 (2012).
Strauss extensively reviews U.S. litigation and state and federal regulation, which nearly always frame
GMOs as a question of health and environmental safety and consumer choice. The exception that
supports the rule is Dennis Kucinich’s failed attempts to pass the Genetically Engineered Technology
Farmer Protection Act “to ensure fairness for farmers and ranchers in their dealings with biotech
companies that sell genetically engineered seeds, plants, or animals” and to mitigate “abuses” that
threaten farmers’ market access and the survival of family farms. See Genetically Engineered
Technology Farmer Protection Act, H.R. 3555, 112th Cong. (2011).
144. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer’s Role(s) in Deliberative Democracy, 5 NEV.
L.J. 347 (2004).
145. For an overview, see Amy J. Cohen & Michal Alberstein, Progressive Constitutionalism and
Alternative Movements in Law, 72 OHIO ST. L. J. 1083 (2011).
146. See, e.g., Lawrence E. Susskind, Consensus Building, Public Dispute Resolution, and Social
Justice, 35 URB. L.J. 185 (2008).
147. See, e.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 100; William H. Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming
Rights: The Pragmatist Challenge to Legal Liberalism, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127 (2004).
148. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Supreme Court Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124
HARV. L. REV. 4 (2010).
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scholars are typically interested in decentralization as projects of political
149
democracy, defined narrowly to exclude economic life. This is the case, I
should stress, even as some of these scholars have criticized the antidemocratic
effects of large corporations. These criticisms are characteristically expressed as
condemnation of legal rules, such as those announced in Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission, that treat corporations (and unions) analogously
to individuals with First Amendment rights to influence political elections
150
through spending. Daniel Tokaji, for example, argues that Citizens United
151
undermines “an egalitarian vision of democracy.” But notice how he develops
this claim: “Various types of federal and state laws help both individuals and
corporations amass wealth. That is not to suggest that there is anything wrong
with such laws. The problem. . .[is] that corporations [will] use their wealth in
152
the political sphere, giving have-a-lots greater influence on election results.”
Legal arguments for retrenching corporate power in electoral politics are quite
different from arguments about the conditions necessary to create democratic
153
forms of economic, and hence, political life.
Indeed, Tokaji’s affirmation of legal rules that allow corporations to expand
in size and power in the “economic sphere” represents, in Kennedy’s terms, the
revival and reconfiguration of classical legal thought—a set of ideas, Kennedy
explains, that when deployed today in the market represent a view of law as
154
neoliberal ideology. As a principle to regulate markets, neoliberalism
privileges a Coasian ideal of efficiency as well as the formal equality of all
market actors, and it celebrates the individual entrepreneur by her capacity to
155
innovate at an ever-expanding scale. It also aims to configure market
exchange without jurisdictional or geographical limits or bounds.
This is an evolution in law that scholars have traced quite clearly in the
149. Schragger, supra note 83, at 1084–85.
150. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
151. Daniel P. Tokaji, The Obliteration of Equality in American Campaign Finance Law: A TransBorder Comparison, 5. J. PARLIAMENTARY & POL. L. 381, 382, 393 (2011).
152. Id. at 389.
153. See also William H. Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1335 (1991). In
1991, Simon observed that “American legal culture tends to treat property ownership largely as a
constraint on politics and not as a prerequisite to political participation,” and thus it neither defends
minimum access to property for the poor nor capital constraints for the wealthy on political/citizenship
grounds. Id. at 1354. Against what he called classic liberalism—a view of democracy that confines
“norms of equality and participation . . .to a narrowly defined sphere of government”—Simon defended
a social-republican view of democracy that conditions property ownership on community participation
(such as in cooperatives) and that imposes restraints on accumulation in order to limit inequality among
community members. Id. at 1335–36.
154. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 64. In his contribution to this issue, Christopher Tomlins describes
neoliberalism as the unifying logic of our contemporary legal moment. Christopher Tomlins, The
Presence and Absence of Legal Mind: A Comment on Duncan Kennedy’s Three Globalizations, 78 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., nos. 1–2, 2015 at 1. In this article, I view neoliberalism as the overwhelmingly
dominant American approach to market regulation, but with Kennedy, not as hegemonic of all of
contemporary legal thought.
155. Think, in colloquial terms, of Nixon’s Secretary of Agriculture, Earl Butts who told farmers to
“get big, or get out.” See Michael Carlson, Obituary: Earl Butz, THE GUARDIAN, February 4, 2008.
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context of antitrust—where, in the words of Barak Orbach, “size is not a
156
concern.” Orbach is describing our now dominant interpretations of antitrust
law, espoused most famously by Robert Bork and Richard Posner, in an effort
“to dispel any remaining anti-bigness shadows from American competition
157
laws” associated with social-era jurists like Brandeis. In the 1970s and 1980s,
Chicago school economists and legal scholars argued that the public interest is
best served, not via a market comprised of many competitive smaller or
medium-sized firms, but rather via a regulatory regime that allows marketdominant firms to expand, provided that this configuration maximizes the total
158
surplus value generated across an economy. Indeed, from this perspective, if
159
prices are competitive, firms may consolidate until only three remain. This
efficiency argument functions today as a powerful defense of bigness even if, as
Orbach argues, the neoliberal legal position does not have any a priori
commitments to size.
Or, to put the point another way, progressive decentralist legal scholars tend
not to directly challenge the neoliberal consensus on market size or scale as a
primary organizing principle for economic activity, even as they argue for
enhanced forms of democratic participation and self-determination in legal and
political institutions. (Although several such scholars, to be sure, would
condition genuine political participation on secondary forms of economic
redistribution such as public provisioning of housing, childcare, welfare, and a
minimum wage.)
One of the most complex and puzzling examples of this tendency among
progressive decentralist legal scholars is democratic experimentalism—a legal
reform project pioneered by Charles Sabel, Michael Dorf, and William Simon,
160
among others. In Kennedy’s terms, democratic experimentalists desire a
reconstructed version of the social: they wish to institutionalize conflictingconsiderations policy analysis outside of traditional and hierarchical legal
forums. Indeed, for them, a basic problem in American law is that we have
inherited a centralized legal regime from the New Deal and postwar social
period in which rules are enacted from above to create inflexible administrative
bureaucracies. In place of command and control administration, these scholars
aim to revitalize political decentralization and local forms of democratic
cooperation. Lawmakers, they argue, should enact general rather than specific
rules. And “stakeholders,” rather than passively following these rules, should
participate actively and collaboratively in elaborating, revising, and
161
implementing them.
156. See Barak Orbach, The Antitrust Curse of Bigness, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 608 (2012).
157. Id. at 608; ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
(1978); see also POSNER, supra note 107.
158. See generally, COLIN CROUCH, THE STRANGE NON-DEATH OF NEOLIBERALISM (2011) (ch.
3: “The Corporate Takeover of the Market”).
159. Id. at 60.
160. See, e.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 100; Simon, supra note 147.
161. For a summary of some of the core commitments of democratic experimentalism, see Amy J.
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Schragger reads democratic experimentalism like other contemporary
decentralizing trends in law. He writes:
There are legal scholars who urge us to recover the reformist aspects of
decentralization. A number of local government scholars, for example, have sought to
reinvigorate local government as a constitutional ideal . . . . At the same time, Charles
Sabel and Michael Dorf have encouraged a “Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism,” in which decentralized government plays a significant role in
generating innovative and testable policy programs, a “new form of government” that
enables “citizens . . . to utilize their local knowledge to fit solutions to their individual
circumstances.” But these proposals rarely speak in terms of economic
deconcentration, and mostly ignore the connections between political and economic
162
decentralization.

Schragger’s argument—that democratic experimentalism mostly ignores the
connections between political and economic decentralization—is perhaps
163
understandable on the face of Dorf and Sabel’s 200-plus-page text. But here is
what makes democratic experimentalism both so puzzling and complex: it is
hard to think of a contemporary progressive decentralist legal scholar with a
more developed and nuanced defense of smallholder democracy than Sabel. In
the remainder of this part, I set forth some of his early arguments in order to
illustrate the kinds of political-economic and scalar claims that progressive
decentralist legal scholars today rarely express. In the following part, I illustrate
how food activists inherited some of Sabel’s early ideas even as these ideas
mostly disappeared from decentralist movements in law.
B. The Second Industrial Divide
In 1984, Sabel, along with the labor economist Michael Piore, published The
Second Industrial Divide—an influential and controversial book that traces the
rise and decline of mass manufacturing between approximately 1870 and 1960
in the United States (and in several comparative cases) over three historical
periods that correspond roughly to both Kennedy’s as well as Friedmann and
164
McMichael’s maps.
Strikingly, Piore and Sabel argued that the latenineteenth-century shift from craft to mass production did not reflect the
economic superiority of the mass industrial model as much as extant political
165
interests and market power. In place of mass production, Piore and Sabel
Cohen, Producing Publics: Dewey, Democratic Experimentalism, and the Idea of Communication, 9
CONTEMP. PRAGMATISM 143 (2012); Amy J. Cohen, Governance Legalism: Hayek and Sabel on
Reason and Rules, Organization and Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 357 (2010); Amy J. Cohen, Negotiation,
Meet New Governance: Interests, Skills, and Selves, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 503 (2008).
162. Schragger, supra note 83, 1084–85 (emphasis added) (quoting Dorf & Sabel, supra note 100).
163. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 100.
164. PIORE & SABEL, supra note 7. Like Kennedy and Friedmann and McMichael, Piore and Sabel
write from a perspective that is both transnational and comparative; but, again, I focus my redescription
on the United States.
165. Id. at 37–38. They write further:
[T]he technological possibilities that are realized depend on the distribution of power and
wealth: those who control the resources and the returns from investment choose from among
the available technologies the one most favorable to their interests. . . . [H]istory suggests
that—under different circumstances—the craft sectors could have played a stronger role in
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would resuscitate a (mechanized) version of craft production—in their words
“flexible specialization”—alongside a political philosophy of democracy based
166
on nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century smallholder and yeoman ideals.
The arguments about flexible specialization that Piore and Sabel developed
in The Second Industrial Divide present a vision of smallholder democracy that
is tailored to contemporary times. These arguments also remain a core
justification for democratic experimentalism today, albeit in a rather different
167
way. For both of these reasons, it is worth fleshing out the book’s central
claims.
At the core of the book is a distinction between mass and craft production.
In mass production, semiskilled workers use special-purpose and product168
specific machines to produce standardized goods. Because workers are
subordinated to machines, they are easily governed by top-down mechanisms of
control: management promulgates narrow and inflexible rules to define work
169
tasks and entitlements. By contrast, in craft production, skilled workers use
general multipurpose equipment to produce a more diverse family of small170
batch goods. Because human skill remains key to productivity, labor and
management relations are more collaborative and include criteria of worker
171
merit and self-determination.
These two visions of economic and social organization, Piore and Sabel
argued, require different kinds of markets and hence different kinds of public
and private regulation in order to exist. In mass production, economies of scale
and narrow workplace rules create both efficiencies and rigidities. Expensive
special-purpose tools lower production costs and increase the volume of
standardized goods. But they also limit the ability of mass producers to adjust to
decline or variation in demand—both because fixed costs are high and because
neither the tools nor the rigidly organized workers can be easily reprogrammed
172
to new tasks. As such, mass production requires macroeconomic rules and
policies that generate stable mass markets in which consumption is matched to
173
production. (This was precisely the logic that in agriculture influenced the
Agricultural Adjustment Act and then decades of American food aid policy.)
By contrast, when markets are saturated, uncertain, or unstable, craft

economic development.
Id.
166. Id. at 18.
167. See, e.g., William H. Simon, The Organizational Premises of Administrative Law, 78 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. nos. 1–2, 2015 at 61; William H. Simon, Toyota Jurisprudence: Legal Theory and
Rolling Rule Regimes, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US (Gráinne de Búrca &
Joanne Scott eds., 2006).
168. PIORE & SABEL, supra note 7, at 4.
169. Id. at 113–15.
170. Id. at 5.
171. Id. at 115–20, 278.
172. Id. at 49–51.
173. Id. at ch. 4 (“Stabilizing the Economy”).
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production or “flexible specialization” offers more microlevel self-correcting
174
mechanisms and efficiencies. Workers can reorganize to produce new product
lines using general tools unconstrained by large capital costs. And they do not
need to rely on the state to sustain markets for their goods. The regulatory
problem they confront, however, is that firms may respond to instability and
consumer variation through price competition achieved by sweating labor and
175
cheapening materials, and hence undermine the conditions for innovation.
Flexible specialization therefore requires “the creation, through politics” of
state- and community-based regulatory institutions that exempt wage and price
176
reduction from competition. Such institutions and rules would, in turn, enable
firms to compete “through the innovation of products and processes” and, to
177
that end, also collaborate by sharing information, skills, and technology. Thus,
Piore and Sabel argued, had “craft production prevailed, we might today think
178
of manufacturing firms as linked to particular communities.”
Craft production, however, lost out due to a series of political and
regulatory choices that helped to entrench mass production over time. In the
United States, the shift from craft to mass production—our first industrial
divide—happened under a regime of laissez-faire governance characteristic of
classical legal thought. Between the 1870s and 1920s, large corporations were
left mostly unconstrained by state regulation to coordinate supply and
179
demand. But because the economy had become “extremely sensitive to the
level of consumer purchasing power,” self-stabilization through firm-level
regulation alone proved insufficient to surmount the shocks of the Great
180
Depression and the declining wages that followed it. Indeed, Piore and Sabel
submitted that “the fundamental cause” of the Depression “was the structural
fragility of the economy that was associated with the rise of the mass-production
181
corporation.” Sustaining a mass-production economy, they argued, requires
macroeconomic regulation of economic activity to coordinate supply and
demand—hence, the Keynesian policies of the New Deal and postwar social
period that took industrial, domestic, and international form. For example,
Keynesian policy measures included labor and minimum-wage legislation and
especially “pattern bargaining,” a form of collective bargaining that linked
174. Id. at 17.
175. Id. at 263.
176. Id. at 17, 30, 270.
177. Id. at 30, 283, 298.
178. Id. at 6.
179. Id. at 15 and ch. 3 (“The Corporation”). To manage problems such as overproduction and
instability in levels of consumer demand, corporations deployed strategies such as “segmentation,” that
is, retaining a stable demand for themselves and leaving more risky variable demand for small
producers. They also stabilized their own markets by requiring large customers to enter into long-term
futures contracts. In addition, they developed various forms of vertical integration that enabled them to
vary the amounts of inventory they put on the market; for example, sugar refineries developed
networks of warehouses to manage price fluctuations in raw sugar. Id. at 56–59.
180. Id. at 77.
181. Id. at 75.
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wages to the cost of living and increases in national productivity. They also
183
included increased social welfare and military spending, as well as the Bretton
Woods System that established predictable exchange rates tied to the U.S.
184
dollar. These regulatory structures helped maintain a stable mass economy
until the 1970s when the world witnessed a crisis of mass production. The causes
were numerous and complex, but what was clear, Piore and Sabel insisted, was
that the postwar regulatory system had failed to prevent a crisis within mass
185
industrial capitalism —thus our second industrial divide and another moment
186
of political choice.
C. Flexible Specialization and Smallholder Democracy
In response to the second industrial divide, Piore and Sabel outlined a vision
for the future that would revive “an older conception of the polity” by
187
combining flexible specialization with “yeoman democracy.” In their words:
We need to examine the ideas and industrial communities of the nineteenth-century
American artisans, and of their heirs among the Populists, the twentieth-century craft
workers, and even some modern unions. The small-holder democracy that these
people have practiced and defended shows a way to reconcile individual autonomy . . .
188
with the restricted competition that is essential for flexible specialization.

The contemporary smallholder democracy that Piore and Sabel envisioned
would take root in “industrial districts” comprised of small and medium firms
linked together via “an ethos of interdependence among producers in the same
189
market” and by the use of fair ways to compete. These forms of collaboration
and competition would be maintained, in turn, by familial and community ties
and institutions as well as by regional public social welfare systems that supply,
190
for example, finance, vocational training, and marketing information.
Of course, for Piore and Sabel, as for other decentralist reformers, scale and
size did not represent their own ends. Rather, they stood for particular social
and economic relations—here, ones that allow workers sufficient autonomy,
security, and egalitarian opportunity to respond nimbly and creatively to
market demand. On this view, flexible specialization could be achieved by very
large corporations comprised of federated smaller work groups that operate

182. Id. at 79–82.
183. Id. at 89–91.
184. Id. at 107–11.
185. They included: rises in the prices of oil and wheat; the collapse of fixed exchange rates;
deregulatory measures that undercut the postwar system of wage determination; and the saturation of
domestic markets for consumer durables and new variation in consumer demand. Id. at ch. 7 (“The
Mass-Production Economy in Crisis”).
186. Id. at 252.
187. Id. at 18, 305.
188. Id. at 18.
189. Id. at 265–67, 272.
190. Id. at 273–76. “Among the ironies of the resurgence of craft production,” they argued, “is that
its deployment of modern technology depends on its reinvigoration of affiliations that are associated
with the preindustrial past.” Id. at 275.
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effectively along craft lines. At the same time, however, Piore and Sabel
offered an intrinsic, even moral, case for a different organization of work in
192
contemporary life—one that depends on “solidarity and communitarianism.”
As Sabel wrote in an earlier book about industrial districts in Italy:
If you had thought so long about Rousseau’s artisan clockmakers at Neuchatel or
Marx’s idea of labour as joyful, self-creative association that you had begun to doubt
their possibility, then you might, watching these craftsmen at work, forgive yourself
the sudden conviction that something more utopian than the present factory system is
193
practical after all.

Piore and Sabel thus layered arguments about the potential efficiencies of
decentralized flexible production onto arguments about the kinds of political,
economic, and scalar arrangements that enable workers to live meaningful,
creative, and self-determined lives.
To that end, Piore and Sabel did not rely simply on firm-level and
technological change to determine relations between capital and labor, let alone
transform societies. To the contrary, they made clear that flexible specialization
194
could unfold on the ground in more or less egalitarian ways. Ensuring more
egalitarian economic and social relations, they suggested, requires not only a
reorganization of labor and adversarial shop-floor control but also a state that is
195
“responsible for creating conditions conducive to a republic of small holders.”
This is a state—and especially reinvigorated forms of local and regional
government—that “must guarantee that market transactions do not
permanently advantage one group of traders—and thus undermine the basis of
the balance of wealth and power that makes possible a community of
196
producers.” In such a political regime, property would not be used “to the
maximum advantage of its possessor” but rather “held in trust for the
197
community—its use . . . subordinated to the latter’s maintenance.” In other
words, Piore and Sabel sketched a future where flexible specialization would
both enable and require a particular progressive vision of political economy—
one that embodies democratic community, a multiplicity of producers,
collective individualism, and a redistribution of property rights. This vision has
identifiable antecedents in the periods of classical and social legal thought but is
191. Id. at 267–68. Although large corporations can “serve as the organizational frame of flexible
production,” Piore and Sabel also argued that this model “is not the most promising one for the United
States.” Id. at 300.
192. Id. at 278.
193. CHARLES F. SABEL, WORK AND POLITICS 220 (1982).
194. PIORE & SABEL, supra note 7, at 307. In their words:
We have seen examples of flexible specialization in which property was widely distributed and
authority regarding investments broadly shared; but we have also seen examples in which the
workers had autonomy at the work place, yet the managers (ultimately responsible to private
investors) held control over the fundamental economic decisions.
Id.
195. Id. at 305.
196. Id. at 301, 305 (emphasis added).
197. Id. at 305. For a richly argued account of this view of private property, see Simon, supra note
153.
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without many prominent defenders in contemporary American law.
D. Democratic Experimentalism and Contemporary Law

So what happened to this vision of political economy in democratic
experimentalism? In the decade following the publication of A Second
Industrial Divide, Sabel translated his work on the economy and the firm into a
decentralist legal reform project that coalesced around his 1998 A Constitution
of Democratic Experimentalism coauthored with Michael Dorf (and referenced
199
by Schragger above ). Although flexible specialization anchored the article’s
ideas, Sabel’s emphasis had shifted. He and Piore concluded A Second
Industrial Divide by proposing that the state could “coordinate the necessary
rearrangement of relations among firms, and between labor and capital—and
200
thereby redefine the relation between government and economy.” He and
Dorf opened A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism by offering the
201
new firm as a model for state reform.
To that end, Dorf and Sabel began with a narrative familiar from A Second
Industrial Divide. The rise of large-scale mass production, they explained,
generated centralized and hierarchical regulatory institutions that both
202
mirrored and served to regulate the corporate form. This partnership between
the state and the market held steady until the mid-1970s when the global
economy encountered a crisis of standardized mass production. Firms,
especially in Japan, surmounted the crisis by transforming themselves into
federations of flexible work groups engaged in learning by monitoring,
benchmarking, continuous adjustment, root-cause analyses, and just-in-time
203
production. In the 1990s, Dorf and Sabel continued, American firms adopted
similar techniques—even though they were not subject to similar state
regulatory restrictions, such as lifetime employment, thought to have enabled
204
flexible specialization in Japan. Dorf and Sabel viewed this “rapid diffusion”
of flexible specialization across diverse contexts optimistically. It suggests, they
argued, that actors in numerous and very different “settings are sure enough of
the limitations of organizations premised on bounded rationality and mass
205
production” to reorganize themselves along more open, decentralized lines.
Significantly, Dorf and Sabel proposed that the techniques deployed in
198. Cf. James Q. Whitman, Consumerism Versus Producerism: A Study in Comparative Law, 117
YALE L.J. 340 (2007) (describing how, unlike in the United States, policies designed to support market
access for producers continue to influence the capitalist legal systems in continental European countries
such as Germany and France).
199. Schragger, supra note 83, at 1084–85.
200. PIORE & SABEL, supra note 7, at 306.
201. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 100, at 267.
202. Id. at 292.
203. Id. at 286–88, 297–306.
204. Id. at 297, 305–08. This meant that firms could not lower costs via layoffs but rather had
institutional incentives to retrain their workers. Id. See also PIORE & SABEL, supra note 7, at 161;
Simon, supra note 153, at 1402.
205. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 100, at 312.
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these new firms—what they call the “pragmatist disciplines”—can themselves
206
slowly transform social relations “in the course of [their] operation.” In their
words:
learning by monitoring “politicizes” the economy by introducing a kind of workplace
democracy. Group deliberation in benchmarking, simultaneous engineering, and error
detection become central to all decisions . . . In obliging disputatious yet collaborative
evaluation of how diverse potential products will be used in life, of conflicting ways of
making them, and of the contrasting measures of corporate and individual
performance, learning by monitoring strips from economic decisonmaking the veiling
technicity of maximization of profits given prices, and thus distributes authority from
207
the “rulers” to the “people.”

Dorf and Sabel thus redescribed the flexible specialized firm as a pragmatic
practice and set of deliberative techniques that establish a model for workplace
democracy—a model that they extrapolated apart from social and political
conditions and variability (and, it would appear, apart from unegalitarian
208
instantiations of flexible specialization on the ground ). They then applied this
pragmatist model to argue for the transformation of “political institutions in the
209
form of democratic experimentalism.” These include regulatory and public
service institutions (for example, family support services, community policing,
military procurement, and nuclear and environmental regulations) as well as
branches of government (courts, Congress, and administrative agencies). The
210
article, in turn, spawned a range of similar proposals in public education,
211
212
213
prisons, child welfare services, drug courts, and public land and water
214
management. Democratic experimentalism had thus become a program of
public-sector reform.
I cannot speculate why Sabel, as he constructed democratic
experimentalism, pursued his own deep insights about the mutual conditioning
of the economy and polity in a mostly one-sided way—so that the new
corporation became a model to decentralize the state while the role of the state
in decentralizing the market receded from the project. But for this issue on

206. Id. at 308.
207. Id. at 313.
208. Labor law scholars argue that flexibility norms have mostly eroded, not advanced, worker
security, welfare, and solidarity while enhancing employer control. See Kerry Rittich, Making Natural
Markets: Flexibility as Labour Market Truth, 65 N. IRELAND LEGAL Q. 323 (2014).
209. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 100, at 313 (emphasis added).
210. Brandon L. Garrett & James S. Liebman, Experimentalist Equal Protection, 22 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 261 (2004); James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely
Imagined: The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 183 (2003).
211. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destablization Rights: How Public Law Litigation
Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015 (2004).
212. Kathleen G. Noonan, Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Legal Accountability in the
Service-Based Welfare State: Lessons from Child Welfare Reform, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 523 (2009).
213. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts & Emergent Experimentalist
Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831 (2000).
214. Bradley Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism,
21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189 (2001).
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contemporary legal thought, I can observe the ways in which democratic
experimentalism exemplifies its era. As Kennedy argues, the social-era model
of society as comprised of different organized groups and of the state as
coordinating their coexistence has—in the contemporary legal moment—
215
disappeared. With it has also mostly disappeared the normative idea that law
should regulate markets to protect multiple kinds of producers from “unfair”
competition—or, in Sabel’s terms, the idea that the state should mediate among
different configurations of wealth and power in order to facilitate a community
of producers—rather than, for example, to ensure maximally efficient prices or
nondiscrimination on the basis of protected identities. In this way, we can
understand democratic experimentalism, as Schragger does, as one of several
contemporary progressive decentralist movements that invests its primary legal
and political energy into democratizing the institutions not of the market but of
216
the state.
At the same time, however, the “ideal of yeoman democracy”—the legacy
that Sabel argued is mostly likely to motivate the transformation of the
217
American economy —continues to persist as cultural and political capital
218
among social conservatives and liberals. Indeed, a recent poll reports that a
219
significant majority of Americans prefer smaller businesses to larger ones.
Moreover, this smallholder ideal is perhaps nowhere more visible than in
agriculture itself. To this day, the American state provides extension services,
tax benefits, subsidized credit, and debt relief to farmers, in ways that still offer
220
some preferential treatment for smaller farms. These efforts have not
prevented massive consolidation in food production and distribution, but they

215. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 67.
216. Within the democratic experimentalist project, Sabel has remained interested in the scalar
regulation of the economy but this interest is in the background of the work. See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel
& William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 69
(2011) (suggesting that conventional regulatory tools such as cost-benefit analysis and cap-and-trade
miss the ways in which “publicly subsidized technical assistance may be needed to induce small- and
medium-sized producers to adopt socially desirable practices and to protect them from the competitive
disadvantages that they might suffer vis-à-vis larger producers as a result of regulations requiring
technologically complex responses”).
217. PIORE & SABEL, supra note 7, at 306.
218. An important point, but one beyond the scope of this article, is the uneasy alliance—I would
venture scalar tensions—between American neoliberalism, with its commitments to efficiency and
market rationality in all spheres of life, and neoconservatism, with its moral valorization of family and
religious loyalty that tends to honor the small business, family-scale enterprise, and local commerce. On
the contradictions and powerful overlaps of this alliance, see Wendy Brown, American Nightmare:
Neoliberalism, Neoconservatism, and De-Democratization, 34 POL. THEORY 690, 698 (2006).
219. PUBLIC AFFAIRS COUNCIL, PUBLIC AFFAIRS PULSE SURVEY: AMERICANS’ VIEWS ON
BUSINESS IN AN ELECTION YEAR 17–18 (2012).
220. See, e.g., SUSAN SCHNEIDER, FOOD, FARMING, AND SUSTAINABILITY 14, 41 (2010)
(discussing sections in federal farm bills and in the bankruptcy code that provide greater financial
assistance to small farmers); see also Steven C. Bahls, Preservation of Family Farms—the Way Ahead,
45 DRAKE L. REV. 311 (1997) (surveying state laws that restrict corporate ownership of agricultural
land as well as measures in federal tax law, bankruptcy law, and farm programs designed to protect the
interests of small farmers).
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have led some contemporary legal scholars to argue for the obliteration of the
remaining traces of scale-sensitive protection for small farms and firms in
221
American law.
In the final part of this article, I identify new kinds of yeoman ideals
influencing alternative food movements today. These movements present
themselves as antidotes to mass industrialized food by seeking to relocalize,
respatialize, and re-embed food in particular geographical spaces and moral and
social relations. The normative commitments of these movements include
particular restrictions on size, scale, and social organization—commitments that
help to produce their alternative politics and uneasy relation to contemporary
law.
IV
A CHALLENGE FOR CONTEMPORARY LEGAL THOUGHT?: ARTISANAL
CHEESE AND FAIR TRADE TOWNS
To return to Friedmann and McMichael’s historical narrative, our current
food regime is characterized by the intensive consolidation and corporatization
222
of food production and distribution. Indeed, nearly sixty percent of food and
beverages sold in the United States is controlled by “the ten largest U.S.-based
223
multinational corporations.” Moreover, policy analysts “predict that it is not
unrealistic to imagine future global markets in which the sale of food is
controlled by four to five global firms with a handful of regional and national
224
companies.” This economic concentration was made possible in part by the
relaxed antitrust law and enforcement of the late 1980s and 1990s that enabled a
225
series of mergers and acquisitions among large processors and retailers. It was
also facilitated by the rise of flexible-specialization technologies in large
corporations that were not subjected to the restricted competition, social
protections, and collaborative regulatory infrastructure that Piore and Sabel
226
initially envisioned.
221. See, e.g., Jim Chen & Edward S. Adams, Feudalism Unmodified: Discourses on Farms and
Firms, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 361, 376, 431 (1997). Among their most pressing concerns are insufficient
standards to regulate (often minority) labor on smaller farms.
222. Friedmann calls the present moment a corporate–environmental food regime. Friedmann,
supra note 24, at 251. McMichael calls it the corporate food regime. McMichael, supra note 62, at 273.
223. Thomas A. Lyson, Civic Agriculture and the North American Food System, in REMAKING THE
NORTH AMERICAN FOOD SYSTEM: STRATEGIES FOR SUSTAINABILITY 19, 21 (Clare Hinrichs &
Thomas A. Lyson eds., 2007).
224. OLI BROWN WITH CHRISTINA SANDER, SUPERMARKET BUYING POWER: GLOBAL SUPPLY
CHAINS AND SMALLHOLDER FARMERS 1 (2007).
225. Lyson, supra note 223, at 20–22; see also Ronald W. Cotterill, Continuing Concentration in
Food Industries Globally: Strategic Challenges to an Unstable Status Quo, 49 FOOD MKTG POL’Y CTR.
RES. REP. 1, 1 (1999); Ronald W. Cotterill, Mergers & Concentration in Food Retailing: Implications for
Performance & Merger Policy, 2 FOOD MKTG POL’Y CTR. RES. REP. 1, 1 (1989).
226. As a case in point, consider retail chains—widely considered the most powerful and
oligopolistic actors in food systems today. In the 1970s and 1980s, American and European retailers
developed highly responsive and flexible tracking systems that they used to calibrate increasingly
casualized labor practices quite precisely to fluctuations in consumer demand. See Amy J. Cohen,
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But Friedmann and McMichael, like Kennedy, suggest that our current
moment does not embody a single totalizing logic as much as contradiction,
227
contestation, and opposing forces. For them, the hegemony of corporate
industrial food (including its relentless integration of alternative food trends
228
such as organic ) now sits alongside new forms of counter-hegemonic
resistance. In McMichael’s words, “the corporate food regime embodies the
tensions between a trajectory of ‘world agriculture’ and cultural survival,
229
expressed in the politics of ‘food sovereignty.’”
Indeed, despite corporate intensification over food-supply chains—or
perhaps because of this intensification—it is hard to think of another arena of
everyday life where people as regularly express opposition to large-scale
industrialization and aspirations for alternative forms of capitalist production
and exchange. As Julie Guthman writes,
As an activist movement, the alternative-food movement is one of the most successful
of our day if you consider the numbers of people who identify with it by shopping at
alternative-food institutions, attending events, contributing money, and providing
countless hours to gardening projects, farm-to-school programs and “hanging out”
230
with food.

Although it is challenging to get precise data, food scholars have widely
observed the recent uptick in farmers’ markets, community-supported
agriculture, community gardens, consumer cooperatives, alternative food stores,
231
and place-based and values-based labels. To be sure, these developments
encompass a range of social values including health, wellness, and
environmental protection. But they also increasingly express a core principle of
food sovereignty: namely, that small producers and consumers should make
democratic decisions about food provisioning in particular social and
232
geographical spaces.

Supermarkets in India: Struggles over the Organization of Agricultural Markets and Food Supply
Chains, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 19, 24–29 (2013).
227. See Philip McMichael, A Food Regime Genealogy, 36 J. PEASANT STUD. 139, 148–54 (2009)
(debating whether there is a third distinctive food regime that has fully consolidated).
228. See, e.g., JULIE GUTHMAN, AGRARIAN DREAMS: THE PARADOX OF ORGANIC FARMING IN
CALIFORNIA 51–53 (2004) (describing the production of organic food on small and large farms
disconnected from social movement activism and fair labor practices).
229. McMichael, supra note 62, at 274.
230. JULIE GUTHMAN, WEIGHING IN: OBESITY, FOOD JUSTICE, AND THE LIMITS OF CAPITALISM
143 (2011).
231. See, e.g., Lyson, supra note 225, at 28 (reporting, among other trends, a thirty-five percent
increase between 1992 and 2002 of the number of farms selling directly to the public). As of 2007, the
U.S. Department of Agriculture reports 4385 farmers’ markets and 12,549 farms selling via community
supported agriculture (CSA) arrangements. See Farmers Markets and Local Food Marketing, U.S
DEP’T OF AGRIC., http://www.ams.usda.gov/farmersmarkets/facts.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2015);
Community Supported Agriculture, U.S DEP’T OF AGRIC., http://www.nal.usda.gov/afsic/pubs/
csa/csa.shtml (last visited Jan. 9, 2015). See also Michael Pollan, The Food Movement, Rising, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, June 10, 2010, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/jun/10/foodmovement-rising/.
232. See Philip McMichael, Food Sovereignty in Movement: Addressing the Triple Crisis, in FOOD
SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 127, at 168.
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Why food accomplishes this kind of expressive social work is an intriguing
question. Perhaps it is because people’s relationships to food, unlike their
relationships to the production and consumption of durable goods, are
organized around continuous and repetitive practices: purchasing, cooking,
serving, eating, if not also producing, processing, and trading it. “‘Foodways,’”
as Jakob Klein, Johan Pottier, and Harry West observe, “therefore are
233
profoundly entangled with ‘lifeways.’” The repetitive labor of food, in other
words, is constitutive of self and social relations and, as such, “motivates
234
action.” It is also the case that “[e]ven today, more than half of the world’s
235
population derives a living from food-related work.” Understood from this
perspective, food is a potent symbolic and material practice of everyday life and
thus a powerful tool to reimagine relations of community and economy.
In this final part, I offer two examples of such American reimagining:
artisanal cheese production and scalar debates within the U.S. fair trade
movement. My first example describes food producers themselves who combine
the pursuit of exchange value with the pursuit of other kinds of values,
including small-scale craft production as its own ideal of local development. My
second example is briefer; it touches on how fair trade activists aim to create
particular ethical relations of market exchange that preserve market access for a
multiplicity of local producers (where localism itself is a contested economic
space). Some of these actors go much further in their defense of smallholder
production than Sabel. For them, smallness—including particular kinds of
structural limits to expanding in size—is valued as its own means to achieving
the ends of democratic self-government, local development, and economic
citizenship, even when these ends are not directly tethered to expanding
efficiency and productivity. To that end, the actors I describe embody some of
Brandeis’s smallholder ideals. But they are not engaged in similar efforts to
create a national jurisprudential and legislative architecture of economic
decentralization. Rather than a politics aimed at creating state institutions that
236
foster and coordinate widespread and macrolevel change, artisanal cheese
makers and fair trade activists offer a politics grounded primarily (indeed,
purposefully) in the possibility of transformative social and economic relations
in particular places and networks of exchange—albeit ideally in relations that
237
can be replicated in many other spaces. It is a politics of the local and the
small that, for the most part, is only indirectly expressed in the language of
233. Jakob A. Klein, Johan Pottier & Harry G. West, New Directions in the Anthropology of Food,
in 2 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY 299, 302 (Richard Fardon et al. eds., 2012).
234. BRAD WEISS, THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE HAYA LIVED WORLD 128 (1996).
235. Klein et al., supra note 233, at 302.
236. Cf. Charles Sabel, Dewey, Democracy, and Democratic Experimentalism, 9 CONTEMP.
PRAGMATISM 35, 41–42 (2012) (criticizing industrial districts for the absence of federated governance
structures that connect localities and foster learning among them).
237. Crisinta Grasseni suggests that the metaphor used among many radical food activists “is that
of the strawberry field . . . to indicate a mission to proliferate while maintaining small scale, expanding
into neighboring terrains.” Cristina Grasseni, Reinventing Milk and Cheese in Italy, between Relocalizaiton and Co-production, GASTRONOMICA (forthcoming 2015).
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contemporary law.
A. Artisanal Cheese and Taste of Place
Today, there are more than 450 enterprises that handcraft cheese in the
238
United States—a number that has more than doubled since 2000. Many of
239
these artisanal producers use raw milk to make their cheeses. As Piore and
Sabel would predict, artisanal versus industrial cheese production embody very
different forms of knowledge and skill, as well as processes of variability and
uncertainty. Briefly described, the aim of industrial cheese making is to
240
maximize standardization and predictability. Milk pooled from multiple
sources is pasteurized and homogenized (that is, made consistent in protein and
fat content). Because pasteurization eradicates both pathogenic and beneficial
microbes, industrial milk is then reseeded with commercially produced bacteria
241
necessary for cheese production.
By contrast, “artisan cheese makers
242
embrace—even celebrate—some degree of variability.” Indeed, the microbes
that cultivate artisanal cheese may include mold spores from cave walls or straw
243
mats where the cheese is left to age. Thus Harry West explains that the
process of artisanal cheese production fluctuates with changes in raw materials
seasonally, daily, and sometimes even “from morning milking to afternoon
244
milking,” and hence requires, in Piore and Sabel’s terms, highly flexible and
self-regulating labor.
For many artisanal raw-milk cheese makers, it is the know-how and selfmastery necessary to manage this variability that fuels their alternative agrifood
politics. To ensure both safety and quality, artisan producers must maintain
sufficient control over the entire process. Cleaning, for example, is highly
skilled labor because it enables cheese makers to help beneficial microbes
245
outcompete any pathogens that might be present. “If you want to properly
clean a certain surface,” one cheese maker explains, “you need so much
percentage of soap and so many minutes—if you approach it like that . . . it’s
246
doing something necessary and productive.” As such, many artisanal cheese

238. HEATHER PAXSON, THE LIFE OF CHEESE: CRAFTING FOOD AND VALUE IN AMERICA 3
(2013). See also Heather Paxson, Locating Value in Artisan Cheese: Reverse Engineering Terroir for
New-World Landscapes, 112 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 444, 445 (2010).
239. Heather Paxson, Post-Pasteurian Cultures: The Microbiopolitics of Raw-Milk Cheese in the
United States, 23 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 15, 41 n.1 (2008) (reporting that 85 percent of artisanal
cheese makers in Vermont, 65 percent in New England, and 50 percent nationwide work with raw
milk).
240. Harry G. West, Thinking Like A Cheese: Towards an Ecological Understanding of the
Reproduction of Knowledge in Contemporary Artisan Cheese Making, in UNDERSTANDING CULTURAL
TRANSMISSION IN ANTHROPOLOGY: A CRITICAL SYNTHESIS 320, 321 (Roy Ellen et al. eds., 2013).
241. Id.
242. Id. at 322.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Paxson, supra note 239, at 33.
246. Id. at 33.
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makers argue that “raw-milk cheese is a value-added food that . . . cannot be
successfully absorbed by industry giants; at a scale larger than artisan, a farmer
would have many people working for him or her, thereby losing direct control
247
over production quality.” Likewise, some argue that a clean, safe milk supply
requires pastured animals raised on hay rather than on fermented corn (silage),
248
similarly limiting the possibility of industrial cooptation. Thus precisely what
makes raw-milk cheese of political significance to small producers is likely what
would make it appear marginal to legal reformers with aspirations for
macrolevel policy change: namely, that artisanal control means that there are
structural limits to scaling up its production.
To be clear, these cheese makers know well that restricting raw milk and
cheese production to a small artisanal scale does not itself ensure safety or
quality. Rather, size and scale stand for particular economic and social relations
(as well as commitments to quality) that they must actively nurture and
249
protect. Thus, although artisanal cheese makers regularly link their arguments
about small-scale production to instrumental concerns about risk, more for
them is at stake. As anthropologist Heather Paxson observes,
When producers . . . argue that raw milk production should be restricted to small-scale
operations, they want to secure a symbolic connection between raw milk and small
farmers . . . as a means of sustaining their farms and revitalizing rural communities and
economies. They want to see raw-milk cheese become a cornerstone of a “civic
250
agriculture.”

Civic agriculture is a term coined by the influential rural sociologist Thomas
Lyson to advocate for decentralized practices of food production linked to local
251
development and community identity. Lyson, in turn, modeled it in part on
Piore and Sabel’s proposals for industrial reform. “The civic agriculture
perspective,” Lyson explains, “favors smaller, well-integrated firms/farms
cooperating with each other . . . . The ideal form is the production district,
similar to the industrial district notion mentioned earlier (Piore and Sabel
1984). Producers share information and combine forces to market their
252
products.” As Paxson observes, many artisanal cheese makers likewise
describe small-scale raw-milk cheese production as a practice of economic and
253
social citizenship grounded in place-based development and mutual aid.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Id. at 32.
Id. at 40.
PAXSON, supra note 238, at 60–62.
Paxson, supra note 239, at 35.
See THOMAS A. LYSON, CIVIC AGRICULTURE: RECONNECTING FARM, FOOD, AND
COMMUNITY 1–2 (2004).
252. Lyson, supra note 225, at 25. Lyson writes further, “The state supports these economic
ventures by ensuring that all firms have access to the same resources such as information, labor, and
infrastructure.” See also LYSON, supra note 251, at 75. Other contemporary food scholars also use The
Second Industrial Divide as inspiration for alterative models of agriculture. See, e.g., Amy Guptill &
Rick Welsh, Is Relationship Marketing an Alternative to the Corporatization of Organics? A Case Study
of OFARM, in FOOD AND THE MID-LEVEL FARM: RENEWING AN AGRICULTURE OF THE MIDDLE
55, 61–64 (Thomas A Lyson et al eds., 2008) (describing a “second agricultural divide”).
253. Paxson, supra note 238.
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One of the ways the idea of civic agriculture is expressed among cheese
254
makers is through conversations about terroir or “taste of place” —where
“place,” Paxson clarifies, refers “to the material conditions of a locale—soil,
topography, and microclimate—and also to the cultural know-how behind
agricultural products that help constitute ‘place’ as a locus of shared custom and
255
affective belonging.” Terroir has a long history in French law influenced by
social-era ideas of corporatism and regionalism. And, as we shall see, it lacks a
meaningful analogue in contemporary American law.
Briefly described, in the first decade of the twentieth century, French law
granted legal status to wine “that had an association with a region that was
256
‘local, loyal, and constant.’” In 1935, legislation designed to “protect terroir”
was revised to include quality-based criteria for production, and the regime
grew to include cheese, honey, and agricultural products such as olive oil and
257
potatoes.
Significantly, only groups of producers—not individuals or
corporations—could apply for collective property designations known as
258
appellation d’origine controlee (AOC). As Amy Trubek and Sarah Bowen
explain, “from its very inception, the AOC system has rewarded the collective
259
agency of a group of producers.” In this way, Trubek makes clear, “the rules
and regulations of the AOC system guarantee the possibility of local control,
thus keeping the knowledge and the power in the hands of the growers, the
260
vintners, and others in each agricultural region.” Today, the AOC system also
requires producer groups to respect “the essential principles of ‘representivity’
261
and ‘democracy.’”
To be sure, as a legal and cultural category, terroir can generate struggles
and inequalities as different groups and actors vie to benefit from collective
262
property designations. But it has also provided the basis for formidable

254. AMY B. TRUBEK, THE TASTE OF PLACE: A CULTURAL JOURNEY INTO TERROIR (2008).
255. Paxson, supra note 238, at 444.
256. TRUBEK, supra note 254, at 26.
257. Id. at 27–29.
258. Id. at 26, 28–29.
259. TRUBEK, supra note 254, at 29; Amy B. Trubek & Sarah Bowen, Creating the Taste of Place in
the United States: Can We Learn from the French?, 73 GEOJOUNRAL 23, 25 (2008). See also Sarah
Bowen & Ted Mutersbaugh, Local or Localized? Exploring the Contributions of Franco-Mediterranean
Agrifood Theory to Alternative Food Research, AGRIC. HUM. VALUES (2013) (explaining that the
European “regions with the greatest concentration of [geographical indicators] are frequently
characterized by strong, long-standing collective producer organizations”).
260. TRUBEK, supra note 254, at 31.
261. Trubek & Bowen, supra note 259, at 25. The French AOC system, moreover, “now serves as
the basis for the European Union’s policies on Protected Denomination of Origins (PDO) and
Protected Geographical Indications (PGIs).” Id. at 24.
262. See, e.g., Sarah Bowen, Development from Within? The Potential for Geographical Indications
in the Global South, 13 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 231 (2010) (illustrating how influential market actors
have manipulated the geographical indication standards for tequila against the interests of smaller
producers and the environment); see also Cristina Grasseni, Developing Cheese at the Foot of the Alps,
in REIMAGINING MARGINALIZED FOODS: GLOBAL PROCESSES, LOCAL PLACES 133 (Elizabeth
Finnish ed., 2012).
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collective action. For example, in 1999, the United States placed a sanction on
European agricultural exports, including on the AOC-designated French
Roquefort cheese, after the European Union refused to comply with a WTO
263
decision requiring it to lift its ban on hormone-treated U.S. beef. In response,
members of local sheep-milk associations, along with a powerful smallholders’
agricultural union, engaged in a widely publicized (although mostly symbolic)
effort to dismantle a McDonald’s. Farmers painted the slogan: “McDo out,
264
Roquefort in!” As one union member put it, “We tried to make it clear: it was
265
industrialized agriculture against local artisanal agriculture.”
Terroir is thus a powerful cultural as well as legal concept that is “difficult to
266
translate” —although it often is translated by American legal practitioners as
simply a kind of regional characteristic. As a regional characteristic, terroir
becomes connected to geographical indications—place-based labels that, in the
United States, are a form of intellectual property rights protected under the
federal trademark system, and function simply “as brands, preserving
267
reputation and truth in labeling.” The United States has also enacted federal
268
legislation enabling geographical designations for wine production, but these
can be owned by any individual or corporate entity without regards to “a
cooperative system of governance or the specification of culturally-sensitive or
269
environmentally-sustainable production methods.” In other words, in the
United States, geographical indications are understood apart from scalar and
social concerns such as artisanal standards of production, cooperative
ownership, and democratic forms of governance and local control.
Paxson reports that American artisanal cheese makers discuss terroir in
ways that diverge both from American legal categories as well as from French
cultural and geographical ones. Many American small cheese producers view as
263. Appellate Body Report, European Communities Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) (adopted Feb. 13 1998); see also
Christopher Ansell & David Vogel, The Contested Governance of European Food Safety Regulation, in
WHAT’S THE BEEF? THE CONTESTED GOVERNANCE OF EUROPEAN FOOD SAFETY 3 (Christopher
Ansell & David Vogel eds., 2006).
264. See HELLER, supra note 137, at 187–97.
265. Id. at 190 (quoting José Bové, a member of the Confédération Paysanne). See also JOSÉ BOVÉ
& FRANÇOIS DUFOUR, THE WORLD IS NOT FOR SALE: FARMERS AGAINST JUNK FOOD (2001).
266. Amy B. Trubek et al., Produits du Terroir: Similarities and Differences Between France,
Québec and Vermont 2 (Univ. of Vt., Food System Research Collaborative, Opportunities for
Agriculture Working Paper Series vol. 1, no. 2).
267. Laura Zanzig, The Perfect Pairing: Protecting U.S. Geographical Indications with a SinoAmerican Wine Registry, 88 WASH. L. REV. 723, 725 (2013). The United States created geographical
indications, and then treated them as a subset of trademark law, in order to comply with TRIPS
Agreement requirements. See generally the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, art. 22, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S.299; 15 U.S.C. §1054 (1999). See also Ruth L.
Okediji, The International Intellectual Property Roots of Geographical Indications, 82 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1329, 1333 (2007). Several scholars have criticized this conceptual collapse. See, e.g., Dev Gangjee,
Quibbling Siblings: Conflicts Between Trademarks and Geographical Indications, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1253, 1267 (2007).
268. 27 C.F.R. §9.1 (establishing viticultural areas).
269. Trubek & Bowen, supra note 259, at 29.
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disingenuous a precise claim to regional distinctiveness that consumers can
270
discern via taste. Unlike French practice, American artisanal cheese making
often does not stretch back in particular regions over any length of time;
instead, new entrepreneurs are trying to refabricate artisanal cheese practices
271
suited to the land they have (what one calls “reverse-engineering terroir”).
These small producers certainly recognize the exchange value of terroir as an
intangible marketable commodity; but “to many U.S. cheese makers, the notion
272
is bankrupt if it is nothing but a label legitimating high retail prices.” For
them, terroir does or should stand not only for exchange value but also for
value-based civic ideals that include local stewardship, the transmission of
artisanal know-how, and solidaristic forms of place-based development. As one
cheese maker put it, “We’re working here with the concept of terroir, and that’s
273
local grass.” Local grass, Paxson explains of this usage, means not only that
the cheese will feature the flavors of animals fed on local pastures. Buying grass
274
from community producers also means money that stays “‘in town.’” Another
told Paxson: “I’m setting up a cheese guild,” where producers will share the
costs for equipment and overhead but will have separate labels and businesses;
“this little plant,” the cheese maker anticipated, “will be producing twenty-one
hundred pounds of cheese a week but won’t be one sole proprietor getting
275
bigger and bigger . . . . We will all be artisan.” Here terroir embodies a
community of artisanal producers collaborating and competing but in ways
designed to prevent the emergence of a permanently dominant one. Thus
Paxson concludes that for American artisanal cheese makers, terroir is “a kind
of place marketing, but one that . . . reflects a concerted effort to literally create
the social and economic basis for claims of uniqueness” that producers may use
to enlist consumers in expansive regional, national, even transnational networks
276
of exchange.
Significantly, artisanal cheese makers do not enlist state law to implement
alternative standards for production, property ownership, or economic
development. As Paxson describes it, the state is not particularly relevant to
277
their food politics. At least not beyond their resistance to a legal regime,
designed around industrial dairies, that regulates raw milk as “a potential
278
biohazard.” Federal regulations, for example, require cheese makers to age

270. Paxson, supra note 238, at 449–50.
271. Id. at 451–52.
272. Id. at 449.
273. Id. at 452.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 451.
276. Id. at 452 (internal quotations omitted); id. at 453 (noting that “taste of place is not the same as
taste of proximity”).
277. Id. at 447.
278. Paxson, supra note 239, at 16, 30–32. Paxson describes how cheese makers are creating
alternative forms of social meaning and social relations generated against a “Pasteurian social order”
established and maintained by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.
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raw-milk cheeses for at least sixty days and ban the sale of raw milk in interstate
279
commerce for consumption. To be sure, activists have challenged raw-milk
bans in court. But these efforts are typically articulated from the consumer
perspective in the language of individual rights—for example, rights to privacy,
travel, and choice. This is the case even for organizations, such as the Farm-toConsumer Legal Defense Fund, explicitly committed to the interests of
280
artisanal food producers.
Of course, there are few alternative legal strategies to pursue: as Stephanie
Tai recently observed, “existing legal avenues fail to mesh with the values of the
281
sustainable food movement.” Nor can producers access any sort of legal–
administrative framework like the AOC that combines state-based advocacy for
a community of producers with requirements for collaborative forms of
production and control. Indeed, political scientist Jim Bingen describes recent
unsuccessful efforts by food scholars and policy researchers to encourage the
U.S. Department of Agriculture to transform geographic indications into
strategies of rural development that promote democratic collective organization
282
in the market and protection of smallholder interests by the state.
That said, concerns with small-scale production have begun cropping up in
283
legislative debates about food safety. Most prominently, the 2010 Food Safety
Modernization Act included an (extensively debated) amendment designed to
ease safety restrictions for small farmers. The amendment was based on the
claim, in the words of its cosponsor Senator Jon Tester, that “family growers
284
have more ‘eyeballs to the acre.’” Like artisanal cheese makers, proponents of
279. 21 C.F.R. §§133.182, 1240.61 (2014).
280. See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Complaint for Declaratory, Preliminary and Other Injunctive Relief, Farmto-Consumer Legal Def. Fund v. Sebelius, No. 5:10-CV-04018, (N.D. Iowa Feb. 20, 2010), 2010 WL
1868971 (challenging the federal ban on raw milk). See also generally DAVID E. GUMPERT, THE RAW
MILK REVOLUTION: BEHIND AMERICAN’S EMERGING BATTLE OVER FOOD RIGHTS (2009); KEEP
FOOD LEGAL, http://www.keepfoodlegal.org (last visited Feb. 17, 2015).
281. Stephanie Tai, The Rise of U.S. Food Sustainability Litigation, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1069, 1070
(2012) (surveying recent anti-GMO and animal-welfare litigation).
282. Jim Bingen, Labels of Origin for Food, the New Economy and Opportunities for Rural
Development in the US, 29 AGRIC. HUM. VALUES 543 (2012); Jim Bingen, People, Place and Politics:
Notes for Re-Inventing Food in US Regions, paper presented at The Re-invention of Food, Radcliffe
Institute for Advanced Studies, October 18–19 (2013). In his analysis of worker cooperatives, Simon
puts the point in broader terms: “public efforts in the United States have been relatively insensitive to
the possibilities of small-scale, locally-rooted, human-capital-intensive enterprise.” Simon, supra note
153, at 1402.
283. I should add that democratic experimentalists here speak subtly in the language of law and
context. For example, Sabel and Simon have suggested that new legal regimes governing food safety—
negotiated via broad-based stakeholder participation—can better contextualize risk based on
qualitative distinctions among producers and thus achieve more rational regulatory standards. Charles
F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Contextualizing Regimes: Institutionalization as a Response to the Limits
of Interpretation and Policy Engineering, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1265, 1282 (2012) (describing the
California Leafy Greens Products Handler Marketing Agreement and criticisms calling “for further
contextualization, especially to accommodate small farmers”).
284. Helena Bottemiller, Tester: Small Farmers Won with Food Safety Exemptions, FOOD SAFETY
NEWS, May 5, 2011. For key provisions of the amendment, see 21 U.S.C. § 350h(f)(1) (2012). But see
Nicholas R. Johnson & A. Bryan Endres, Small Producers, Big Hurdles: Barriers Facing Producers of
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the amendment deployed “scale-sensitive” arguments about risk and safety in
order to advocate for a broader set of ideals about local economic development
285
and democracy. Tester himself made some of these broader arguments
explicit: “We deal with consolidation in our energy sector . . . in our banking
sector, and we have consolidation in our food industry, too. The fact is that we
need to not encourage that consolidation . . . . My amendment protects the
286
ability for farmers’ markets to flourish . . . .” As my final brief example
suggests, similar ideals have motivated the localization of fair trade—with
perhaps more transparent efforts to recruit local lawmaking power.
B. Fair Trade and Fair Trade Towns
In the United States, fair trade is a billion-dollar retail business, but one
marked by deep fissures around questions of size and scale, especially the
287
organization of agricultural production. In October 2011, Fair Trade USA
split from the Fair Trade Labeling Organization International, an umbrella
organization that unites domestic certification organizations under a uniform
288
label. Not unlike the French AOC regime, Fair Trade International certifies
only coffee that is grown on farmer-owned cooperatives with democratic
289
principles of self-governance. Certified cooperatives receive a minimum price
for their crop and a premium based on a percentage of sales for social and
economic development. Currently there are 360 certified cooperatives that
produce more coffee than they can currently sell to fair trade buyers (suggesting
290
there is no problem with undersupply).
“Local Foods,” 33 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 49, 91–97 (2012) (noting the lack of empirical evidence
behind the “local food is safer” proposition).
285. See, e.g., Food Safety Action Alert, NATIONAL SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE COALITION,
(Nov. 10, 2010), http://sustainableagriculture.net/blog/food-safety-action-alert-2/; see also Critical Food
DEMOCRACY
NOW!
(Nov.
16,
2010),
Safety
Vote
on
November
17,
FOOD
http://www.fooddemocracynow.org/blog/2010/nov/16/urgent-critical-food-safety-vote-nov-17th/.
286. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act—Motion to Proceed, Congressional Record-Senate,
November 18, 2010 at 38010. A similar set of scalar issues motivated 2013 revisions to Vermont’s
Agricultural Housekeeping Bill to permit on-farm slaughter of a small number of animals for sale to
consumers. See, e.g., Farm Fresh Meat, RURAL VERMONT, http://www.ruralvermont.org/issuesmain/ffmeat/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2015). See also Allison Condra, Food Sovereignty in the United States:
Supporting Local and Regional Food Systems, 8 J. FOOD L. POL’Y 281, 304 (2012) (describing the Local
Food and Community Self-Governance Ordinance of Sedgwick, Maine declaring “the right to produce,
process, sell, purchase and consume local foods thus promoting self-reliance, the preservation of family
farms, and local food traditions”).
287. In 2009, Fair Trade USA estimated its retail sales at $1.2 billion. Fair Trade Up, Charitable
Giving Down, FAIR TRADE USA (Nov. 17, 2010), available at http://fairtradeusa.org/pressroom/press_release/fair-trade-charitable-giving-down.
288. Scott Sherman, The Brawl Over Fair Trade Coffee, THE NATION, Aug. 22, 2012.
289. See FAIRTRADE INTERNATIONAL, FAIRTRADE STANDARDS FOR SMALL PRODUCER
ORGANIZATIONS, VERSION 1.05.2011_V.1.1 30 (2011), available at http://www.fairtrade.net/fileadmin/
user_upload/content/2009/standards/documents/2012-07-11_SPO_EN.pdf. Fair Trade International
restricts four commodities—coffee, cocoa, honey, and cotton—to smallholder cooperatives. See Daniel
Jaffee, Fair Trade Standards, Corporate Participation, and Social Movement Responses in the United
States, 92 J. BUS. ETHICS 267, 277 (2010).
290. Sherman, supra note 288, at 2.
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Fair Trade USA, however, decided to certify coffee produced by waged
farm workers on large plantations and by individual farmers, a decision widely
perceived as an effort to appeal to the large-scale sourcing preferences of large
291
corporations. For many activists, this decision undercut the defining feature of
fair trade—namely, to enable smallholder cooperatives to compete for market
access. As Eric Holt-Giménez, Ian Bailey, and Devon Sampson have argued,
fair trade means helping small farmers “grow not just their market, but their
market power; not just their businesses, but their controlling share within the
292
business.”
This debate suggests broader tensions within contemporary economic
development. In certifying plantation labor, Fair Trade USA promises vastly to
expand the fair trade retail market and thus to advance the interests of the poor
293
through principles of modest redistribution. Most significantly, it guarantees
agricultural laborers on certified plantations a “right” to earn their national
minimum wage—albeit a right that operates through voluntary participation in
294
the market rather than through the coercion of nation-states. By contrast,
activist opponents of Fair Trade USA’s decision privilege democratic
smallholder cooperatives as an independent socioeconomic good. For example,
Equal Exchange, the oldest fair trade coffee distributor in the United States,
demands that the fair trade certification system protect cooperatives from largescale corporate competition (even from competition by plantations “that
295
sincerely do right by their workers”). To that end, they have lobbied the

291. See Sherman, supra note 288; Jaffee, supra note 289, at 277–78. For critiques of fair trade
standards and policies designed in the interests of large corporations see Jaffee, supra note 289; Daniel
Jaffee & Philip H. Howard, Corporate Cooptation of Organic and Fair Trade Standards, 27 AGRIC.
HUM. VALUES 387 (2010).
292. Eric Holt-Giménez, Ian Bailey & Devon Sampson, Fair Trade to the Last Drop: The Corporate
Challenges to Fair Trade Coffee, 24 LEISA MAGAZINE 19 (2008), available at
http://www.agriculturesnetwork.org/magazines/global/towards-fairer-trade/fair-to-the-last-dropcorporate-challenges-to. See also Darryl Reed, What Do Corporations Have to Do with Fair Trade?
Positive and Normative Analysis from a Value Chain Perspective, 86 J. BUS. ETHICS 3 (2009) (discussing
how plantation certification stands to squeeze out small producers); A. Tucker, Fair Enough?, THE
NEW INTERNATIONALIST, Nov. 2006.
293. Paul Rice, Fair Trade USA: Why We Parted Ways with Fair Trade International,
TRIPLEPUNDIT (Jan. 11, 2012), http://www.triplepundit.com/2012/01/fair-trade-all-fair-trade-usa-plansdouble-impact-2015/.
294. Fairtrade USA’s standards for plantation certification are currently under construction. Fair
Trade Standards, FAIRTRADE USA, http://fairtradeusa.org/certification/standards (last visited Feb. 17,
2015). But they will likely approximate Fairtrade International’s standards, which require payment of a
national minimum wage, the right to unionize, minimum safety conditions, and price premiums for a
local development fund. FAIR TRADE STANDARD FOR HIRED LABOR, FAIRTRADE INTERNATIONAL
(2014), available at http://www.fairtrade.net/fileadmin/user_upload/content/2009/standards/documents/
generic-standards/2014-1-15_HL_EN_FINAL.pdf.
295. Why Is Equal Exchange For Co-Ops And Against Plantations In The Fair Trade System?,
EQUAL EXCHANGE, http://www.equalexchange.coop/about/fair-trade/faqs/why-equal-exchange-coops-and-against-plantations-fair-trade-system (last visited Feb. 17, 2015). Fair trade activists against
plantation certification are not indifferent to plight of agricultural laborers. To the contrary, many
criticize standards based on a minimum rather than a living wage and the right to unionize rather than
union representation. Jaffee, supra note 289, at 276. But see Sandy Brown & Christy Getz, Towards
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largest American retailer of fair trade coffee to exit the Fair Trade USA
296
system. They have also helped launch an alternative label—the Small
Producers Symbol (SPP)—and have encouraged processers and retailers to
participate in strengthening and expanding this cooperative agricultural
297
model.
This is not a simple debate. As anthropologist Sarah Lyon argues, “fair
298
trade’s single most important limitation is its small market size.” For that
reason, Fair Trade USA has formally adopted a scale-agnostic view on
certification: for the sake of expanding its share of the retail coffee market, Fair
Trade USA includes actors of various size and social organization provided that
they meet a minimum set of social welfare requirements. But this scale-agnostic
view also recalls the neoliberal position: if large actors consequently crowd out
smaller ones, that is of secondary significance. By contrast, Equal Exchange
explicitly privileges small-scale and decentralized workplaces as a necessary
(albeit not sufficient) means of creating democracy and justice in economic life.
Neither side has tried to engage state lawmaking processes in support of its
scalar fair trade vision. But it seems clear that Equal Exchange’s rather
Brandeisian commitments would be far more challenging to mobilize in
contemporary legal form than would be a proposal to use the market to expand
social entitlements to individual agricultural workers.
Lyon explores how fair trade activists have nonetheless begun to engage
local lawmaking bodies. These activists, critical “of the movement’s co-optation
by large-scale corporate interests,” have turned away from an exclusive focus on
producer communities in developing economies and towards what J.K. Gibson299
Graham calls a “global politics of local transformations.” They aim to enlist
local governments in designating particular American communities as “fair
trade towns” in order to cultivate alternative economic practices in the places
300
“where they themselves live.”
To that end, the fair trade town movement lobbies local governments to
enact rules like this Buy Local/Buy Fair ordinance passed in 2008 by the city of
Northampton:
The City of Northampton hereby establishes a Buy Local/Buy Fair policy to maximize
purchase of locally produced, Fair Trade Certified, and/or fairly traded products from
locally owned businesses in the process of procuring necessary goods for municipal

Domestic Fair Trade? Farm Labor, Food Localism, and the ‘Family Scale’ Farm, 73 GEOJOURNAL 11
(2008) (arguing that privileging “family scale” farms in fair trade policy may obscure the needs of
agricultural laborers).
296. See, e.g., An Open Letter to Green Mountain Coffee Roasters from Equal Exchange: Please
Leave Fair Trade USA (May 20, 2012), available at http://equalexchange.coop/open-letter-greenmountain-coffee-roasters-equal-exchange.
297. See SMALL FARMERS. BIG CHANGE, http://smallfarmersbigchange.coop (last visited Feb. 17,
2015).
298. Sarah Lyon, Fair Trade Towns USA: Growing the Market within a Diverse Economy, 21 J.
POL. ECOLOGY 145, 148 (2014).
299. Id. at 149.
300. Id.

COHEN_FORMATTED_BOOKPROOF-CROSS-REFERENCED (DO NOT DELETE)

3/3/2015 1:11 AM

142

[Vol. 78:101

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
operations . . . ; and

As authorized under MGL Ch. 30B, Section 20, the City of Northampton hereby
establishes a preference for products of agriculture grown or produced using products
301
grown in the Commonwealth. . . .

There are currently thirty-two fair trade towns (and sixty-nine campaigns in
302
303
progress), often with uneasy relationships to Fair Trade USA. I have not
discovered ordinances that reject the Fair Trade USA label. But activists now
confront a different set of scalar questions. They must debate what localism
means as a legal category of town and city governance. Is it a proximate
geographical space or an aspiration for alternative forms of capitalist global
304
exchange? One city official in Northampton proposed to blur the distinction:
“the buy local, buy fair message is a very inclusive message: to embrace local
305
farmers but also to embrace small farmers around the world.” Another fair
trade town campaign in Vermont set clearer proximate priorities: “Buy local
306
and when you can’t buy local buy fair.” The point I wish to stress, however, is
that fair trade towns represent an explicit attempt to enlist legal power in the
politics of relocalization (with all of its complexities and inequalities). But even
here there is ambivalence and debate. Lyon reports that campaign leaders have
307
proposed to recognize fair trade towns without formal legislative enactment.
In 1989, Friedmann and McMichael concluded their history of food regimes
by predicting that if renationalization was the protective movement of the past,
“relocalization combined with global co-ordination may be the protective
308
movement of our times.” My examples are microillustrations of this point—
smallholder artisanal cheese production and fair trade towns represent a
response to the mass industrialization of food that combine efforts to localize
production and market exchange with value-based commitments that link these
locations to communities of producers and consumers in many other spaces.
But, compared to renationalization, these processes of relocalization engage far
less with state law.
As we have seen, the renationalization of food happened during the social
period. There, elite reformers actively recruited law to debate the organization
of the economy along scalar and corporatist lines. The organization that
prevailed—large-scale national industrialization—was made possible by a legal
logic of social development that empowered planners confidently to assert that
301. City of Northampton, Buy Local/Buy Fair Resolution, (Apr. 17, 2008), available at
http://www.northamptonma.gov/DocumentCenter/View/872.
302. Fair Trade Towns, FAIR TRADE CAMPAIGNS, http://fairtradecampaigns.org/campaigntype/towns/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2015). The first fair trade town was established in 2005.
303. Lyon, supra note 298, at 153.
304. Id. See also Bowen & Mutersbaugh, supra note 259.
305. Lyon, supra note 298, at 155.
306. Id. (describing the rhetorical strategy of the campaign). See also Derrick Braaten & Marne
Coit, Legal Issues in Local Food Systems, 15 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 9, 26, 29–31 (2010) (noting the rise of
local agricultural sourcing requirements over the past five years).
307. Lyon, supra note 298, at 150 n.7.
308. Friedmann & McMichael, supra note 2, at 114.
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they were using law to advance a single, desirable social end. National processes
of industrialization, in turn, produced multinational food corporations with
interests that did not necessarily overlap with the interests of states (or citizens).
Here, again, law mattered a great deal. The contemporary revival of classical
legal thought in the market helped to naturalize the power of multinational
corporations with its commitment to the formal equality of all market actors
constrained in their ability to expand only by a particular calculation of
efficiency.
Against this configuration of corporate power, actors today are reimagining
more spatialized and scale-sensitive markets within our global capitalist food
309
economy. Fair trade coffee activists like Equal Exchange are reviving debates
about whether size and scale are legitimate categories to articulate a social and
economic, if not yet legal, vision of the good. To that end, they share with
artisanal cheese makers the idea that social and economic policy should be
concerned not only with growth, or even distribution, but also with the politicaleconomic and scalar conditions that enable people to exercise a meaningful
310
amount of democratic control over the conditions of their lives. In both cases,
we have seen early and experimental attempts to embed such processes of
relocalization within practices of state power (such as the Food Safety
Modernization Act Amendment and fair trade town ordinances). But the actors
I described express their commitments to cooperative forms of smallholder
production primarily in the language of mutual aid, voluntary exchange, and
movement-based politics, and are only just beginning to consider whether and
how to influence the institutions of contemporary law.
V
CONCLUSION
This article on contemporary legal thought weaves together several different
temporal and conceptual threads. I began by redescribing influential
metanarratives of law and food in order to illustrate how law shapes food
systems and facilitates their transformation. I argued that by reading food
regimes through Kennedy’s three periods of legal thought, we can see how ideas
of scale and size have functioned as legal arguments about the desirability of
different kinds of market relations—arguments that have stood for a range of
values including class-based activism, democratic forms of economic selfgovernance, and cooperative and decommodified forms of economic production
and that have been more or less compelling at different moments in time.

309. My examples are not efforts to upend capitalist global food systems but rather to create
“alternative economic spaces . . . [and] operational logics” within them. DAVID GOODMAN, E.
MELANIE DUPUIS & MICHAEL K. GOODMAN, ALTERNATIVE FOOD NETWORKS: KNOWLEDGE,
PRACTICE, AND POLITICS 9 (2012).
310. There is some parallel here to the communitarian ideal of economic citizenship advanced by
Michael Sandel. See MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A
PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1998) (especially ch. 8: “Liberalism and the Keynesian Revolution”).
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I then turned to the present and observed that there is growing interest
among contemporary American legal scholars in the practices, techniques, and
theories of decentralization. But this interest, I argued, enlists institutions not of
the market but of the state. As a telling example, I described democratic
experimentalism. Whereas contemporary food scholars have revived Sabel’s
critiques of mass industrial production to argue for alternative forms of
311
smallholder agricultural production and exchange, among legal scholars,
democratic experimentalism stands primarily for public sector reform. I thus
suggested that a robust debate about democratizing markets is missing among
progressive decentralists in law.
In the final part, I examined efforts to create alternative forms of capitalism
that take seriously restrictions on the scalar conditions of production and
exchange. In my two examples—artisanal raw-milk cheese production and fair
trade towns—attention to size and scale gives rise to normative arguments, ones
that are infused with particular solidaristic and ethically based values. It is not
itself a legal consciousness in Kennedy’s terms—that is, attention to size and
scale is not a way “of conceiving of the legal organization of society” that is the
common property of the left and the right and in which an infinite variety of
312
regulatory and justificatory arguments are expressed. Rather, in my examples
invocations of the local and the small represent ways in which ordinary people,
living under late neoliberal conditions, are trying to create more ethical and
democratic forms of market exchange that include market access for a
multiplicity of producers. As such, alternative food movements are tapping into
a broader popular consciousness, one that Mark Tushnet suggests that
Americans today experience mostly as “discontent”—namely, the idea that “the
concentration of economic power in transnational corporations . . . deprives
313
United States citizens of important powers of self-governance.”
I want to conclude nonetheless by emphasizing that there is of course
nothing intrinsically emancipatory about the local and the small. To the
contrary, scalar construction is always politically complex. It is capable of
reproducing as much as challenging existing inequalities and hierarchies as
social and geographical boundaries are defined to include and exclude various
314
actors and spaces on the ground. In Julie Guthman’s words: “eating local,
organic, seasonal food that you prepared yourself may be pleasurable but it is

311. I should add: an important literature emphasizes the limits of industrial–agricultural
comparisons (because of the unique features of food production and food markets) but its arguments
are beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., David Goodman & Michael Watts, Reconfiguring the
Rural or Fording the Divide, 22 J. PEASANT STUD. 1 (1994); Ben Fine, Towards a Political Economy of
Food, 1 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 519, 533–38 (1994).
312. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 22–23, 63.
313. Mark Tushnet, A Public Philosophy for the Professional-Managerial Class, 106 YALE L.J.
1571, 1571 (1997).
314. See, e.g., E. Melanie DuPuis & David Goodman, Should We Go “Home” To Eat?: Toward a
Reflexive Politics of Localism, 21 J. RURAL STUD. 359 (2005).
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not universally so, nor is it tantamount to effecting social justice.” Indeed, her
own critical history of the organic movement in the United States includes
analysis of how its commitments to size (privileging small versus large farms)
became a commitment to form rather than to the “processes of social and
316
ecological exploitation that gave rise to the organic critique in the first place.”
Nor is there anything intrinsically emancipatory about a state that prioritizes
the interests of a multiplicity of producers—as James Whitman has shown such
producerist systems have overlapped with a range of (socialist to fascist)
317
political values.
I have used the analytical categories of size and scale as a theme throughout
this article to make a more limited and descriptive point. Namely, to make
visible the ways in which contemporary resistance to concentration in food
markets has mobilized older ideas of smallness and bigness as normative
categories of food production and distribution—ideas now stretched over
changing contemporary configurations of (conceptual and territorial) local and
global space. It is far from clear whether and how this resistance will succeed in
democratizing power and, if so, with what distributional effects (on, for
example, labor, class, gender, and family relations). But it is precisely for this
reason that contemporary food activism presents an opportunity to reconstruct
a left-legal analytics of size and scale. And perhaps, beyond an analytics, a set of
political arguments about economic self-governance that can be cultivated from
within the contradictory and unsynthesized tools of contemporary legal
thought.

315. GUTHMAN, supra note 230, at 5. See also SUSANNE FREIDBERG, FRESH: A PERISHABLE
HISTORY (2009).
316. GUTHMAN, supra note 228, at 12, 174–76.
317. Whitman, supra note 198, at 357–60.

